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Abstract 
 
In this study it is aimed at answering the question on how the peace process in Myanmar can be 
understood in an international perspective by looking at the involvement of third parties and what 
seems to be the sticking point in the conflict: diverging perceptions of the state. 
By looking at reports, news articles and academic journal it concludes that external third parties 
have a rather limited role in the peace process, compared to experiences in other intra-state 
conflicts. Through a presentation of the criticism towards international interference in domestic 
affairs and an analysis of the contested perception of the state, perspectives are given on the 
reluctance of Myanmar actors towards international actors, as well as the complex nature of the 
peace process in Myanmar.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Placing the study in international politics perspective 
The number of intra-state wars has notably increased in the decolonization period and after the end 
of the Cold War, the Uppsala Conflict Dataset shows (UCDP 2013). Many of the earlier European 
colonial states were troubled in addressing the complex question of how to establish a new 
independent state. Some states resolved the transition peacefully while others ended in long lasting 
civil wars over different interests in the transition process (Cooper 2005; Stucktey 2011). This was 
also the case of the East Asian country Burma, now titled Myanmar1. In the aftermath of the Cold 
War and after the fall of the Soviet Union the previous power constellations in the world changed. 
The balance of power shifted and a new world order came about (for more on that discussion see 
Bull 1977, Layne 2012, Iriye 2002).  With the contemporary global governance and its focus on 
human rights2 it can be argued that new practices of state sovereignty, as it has earlier been 
understood, have come about3. With the increase in intra-state wars as well as an increased global 
interdependence, there has been a growing tendency of external actors interfering in local conflicts. 
Inserting military troops and peacekeeping operations, facilitating peace building support in terms of 
funding and advise and third party mediation between conflicting parties have been instruments of 
the international society to assist in the creation peace (Ramsbotham et al. 2010). It contrasts with 
previous approaches of non-interference in intra-state conflicts, where states primarily engaged in 
those kinds of conflicts through regional frameworks (Bell 2006: 373-374) or did not interfere at all 
(Wallensteen 2012). 
 
1.2 Research focus 
The current peace process in Myanmar is interesting in the light of the above-mentioned tendency. 
Myanmar, at that time called Burma, has been a military regime since 1962 with limited connection 
to the outside world (ICG 2014b, Nilsen 2013). The Burmese peace negotiations started over 60 
                                                
1 In this report we choose to use the current name of the country; Myanmar. We are aware of the fact that ongoing discussions disagree 
on whether to use the name Burma or Myanmar, due to the fact that Myanmar is a name enforced by the military regime, but calling it 
Burma refers to the ethnic majority having the power, and it would at the same time be to undermine the sovereignty of the state 
(myanmar.um.dk). Therefore we have chosen to call it Myanmar. 
2 See e.g. David Armstrong’s article ‘Law, Justice and the Idea of World Society’ (1999) 
3 Mark Mazower argues in his article ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’ that with the subscription to the early “human 
rights regime” of the “new UN”, international will (understood as states’ commitments to certain international ‘rules’) was considerably 
weakened compared with the arrangements of the Leage of Nations in the interwar period (Mazower 2004). Armstrong (1999) presents 
the shift as a shift from ‘international law’ to ‘world law’ building on a consensus, that, as could be interpreted from his words, challenge 
the notion of state sovereignty. An more radical interpretation of this shift would be that the influence from international law and the new 
‘human rights regime’ include a much more subtle form of power and ‘international will’, that now has become so dominant that we are 
not able to look beyond it (this approach is presented by e.g. Hardt and Negri 2000) 
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years ago when a large number of ethnic minority groups were struggling to reach an agreement on 
how to build the state after British colonial rule. Today Myanmar is an ongoing and recent example 
of a state still struggling with negotiating peace between the government and armed ethnic groups. 
The first peace negotiations between the ethnic groups, the so-called Panglong (I) agreement started 
after the country gained independence from British colonial rule in 1948. The agreement was 
reached, but with the killing of Aung San (the father of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi) it was 
destroyed by a military coup. This resulted in 60 years of internal violent conflict where the national 
army has fought different ethnic groups over land, distribution of natural resources and the ethnic 
groups’ right to self-determination. A massive violation of human rights has resulted in decades of 
international embargos from the international society leaving the country more or less isolated from 
the rest of the world (Nilsen 2013, BNI 2014).  
Despite of attempts to solve the conflict and establish sustainable ceasefires, no real break through 
was made until 2011 when the government with president Thein Sein leading the way, initiated the 
first steps towards a democratic and peaceful transition of the country. This included the release of 
the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and many other political prisoners (voanews.com 2014). 
With this followed also the entrance of an abundant number of non-governmental organizations, 
international as well as national, aiming at assisting the process primarily with humanitarian aid 
(Saha 2011). 
In order to start the democratic transition, president Thein Sein announced his will to establish 
ceasefires and permanent peace in the war-torn country on August 18th 2011, and by doing that he 
also invited external actors to contribute to the peace process. Theory building within the field of 
contemporary conflict resolution presents how it has become a common tendency for external actors 
to help facilitate and mediate in the resolution of an intra-state conflict (Wallensteen 2012, 
Ramsbotham et al. 2010, Svensson 2009, Bell 2006). Several examples show that external 
involvement has a positive effect on the peace process, even though it is a political field of tension 
where the external actor stand in a vulnerable and complex situation, in which it is easy to be 
exposed to criticism4. In the light of the history of Myanmar and the decades of isolation from the 
international society, we find it interesting to scrutinise the involvement of third parties in the 
Myanmar peace process and to what extend the different parties have been allowed to interact in the 
process. We have identified that, as is the case of most intra-state wars in the post-colonial period, 
this conflict is, in its most fundamental core, a dispute over the perception of the state. When intra-
state conflicts become internationalized and external actors are influential in the establishment of 
                                                
4 Both the UN, the US, Norway and Britain have received critique for their peace interventions all over the world (Wallensteen 2012, 
Ramsbotham et al. 2010 etc.) 
 4 
peace, it also touches upon the question of national sovereignty. External actors get a say in the 
political affairs around redefining centrals issues of statehood. They become, with the concept from 
the professor in law, Christine Bell, norm promoters (Bell 2006), and this aspect, it is argued, has 
long received too little focus from peace researchers and –workers (Paris 2002, Goetchel and 
Hagmann 2011 etc.). But we have found Myanmar to be a case that stands out in comparison with 
most other contemporary peace processes dealing with intra-state conflicts in the more subtle way 
international actors are involved. To gain a deeper understanding of the Myanmar conflict in an 
international perspective we therefore look at the twin aspects of respectively the involvement of 
third parties and the contested perception of the state as a sticking point in the conflict.  
 
1.3 Research question 
In light of the above-presented interests we therefore pose the following research question, which 
this study should aim at answering: 
  
How can the peace process in Myanmar be understood in an international perspective when looking 
at the involvement of third parties and the contested perceptions of the state as a sticking point? 
 
1.4 Methodological reflections 
 
In the following we will describe our methodological considerations and steps in the study of the 
peace process in Myanmar. We will outline how we go forward in the analysis in order to answer 
our research question, and through this outline of the report, literature and other data we have 
referred to will be presented. 
 
Outline of report and literature used 
After we have made this outline of our methodological reflections the theoretical framework will be 
presented. Here we will present concepts and ways to understand the involvement of third parties in 
intra-state conflicts. The authors we derive from in the theoretical framework are Peter Wallensteen 
(2012); Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (Rambotham et al. 2005); Isak 
Svensson (2009); Christine Bell (2006); Roland Paris (2002); Oliver P. Richmond (2006) and 
Laurent Goetschel and Tobias Hagmann (2011). This rather broad selection of authors gives 
different relevant perspectives on the cause, some give overviews over the general lines in the field 
 5 
of peace and conflict studies – with a special focus on third parties, and others pose more critical 
approaches to peace building and the existing research on the topic.  
The theoretical concepts and understandings will be used during our analysis, which we have 
divided in four sections, the fourth being a discussion (chapter 3) taking in aspects from the three 
analytical sections (chapter 2).  
As we wish to look at the current peace process in Myanmar, the first analytical section (2.1) will 
present the historical and contextual framework of our case. A great number of researchers have 
studied Myanmar, and of this we deploy selected books and background articles, as well as recently 
published analyses of the conflict and the situation. One dominant source is the comprehensive 
report that was published in March 2014 by Burma News International (BNI) about the peace 
process; ‘Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process’ (BNI 2014)5. As BNI explains it, it is a reference 
guide to the process, and it contains 240 pages of information about events, statements, agreements 
and actors. This has given us important insights into the conflict and the process, as well as it has 
pointed out central actors involved.  
Next step (2.2.) is an analysis of the third parties in the current peace process in Myanmar. In order 
to focus our study we have chosen to concentrate on the actors that we have identified as the most 
dominant; the Norwegian Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) and Burmese Businessmen 
respectively. This means that we have not included other external actors who have been present as 
observers or donors – such as the Japanese Nippon Foundation, British representatives as well as the 
neighbouring countries China (who has made efforts to become the mediator, according to Nilsen 
2013: 123) and Thailand (where some peace meetings have been held, BNI 2014). We are aware 
that they could give relevant perspectives, but we would at the same time argue that they do not 
possess a role that is significantly dominant. Integrating them in order to answer our research 
question would not have changed our conclusion fundamentally, we believe. The analysis of the 
third parties in Myanmar will refer to the recent report published by the Myanmar Peace Support 
Initiative (MPSI) about the lessons learned after having worked two years in Myanmar. Moreover 
we will deploy points from an independent operational review made by Chris Johnson and Michael 
Lidauer on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Johnson and Lidauer 2014). We 
are aware that given the fact that the external review is made by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs it is important to be critical about the objectivity of the so-called independent review. It may 
be independent to the institution of MPSI, but it is published and paid by the Norwegian Ministry, 
                                                
5 Funded by the Open Society Foundation, www.opensocietyfoundations.org  
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which limits how independent it can be. Furthermore, in section 2.2 we deploy news articles and the 
above-mentioned report from BNI.  
This will be followed by a third part of the analysis (2.3.), namely a study of the diverging 
perceptions of the state. First and foremost it will be a thoroughgoing look at the constitution from 
2008 and the different opinions about it. Apart from referring to the official document of the 
constitution, we will include two analyses of the constitution made by others (Ghai 2008 and Nilsen 
and Tønnesen 2012). Furthermore the inaugural speech held by the president will be referred to, 
combined with academic - and news articles discussing the issue of the contested statehood of 
Myanmar.  
As a way to gather all the aspects presented in the earlier three sections, the fourth and last part of 
the analysis (chapter 3) will be a discussion about how to understand the peace process in Myanmar 
in the light of the two aspects, 1) the third parties involved, and what we know about third party 
involvement in general and 2) the diverging perceptions of statehood as a central point in the 
conflict, and one of the central problems that a peace agreement would have to solve. Discussing 
these crosscutting aspects we will also refer to experiences from other peace processes in order to 
nuance the question of international influence in local conflicts. We will combine this with the 
critique of the liberal peace paradigm as we have presented it in the theoretical framework 
presentation.  In this discussion it will be asked whether the critique towards international influence 
in domestic affairs and the memories from other peace and state building interventions (like in East 
Timor) can explain something about the current attitude from Burmese side towards external actors.  
 
Literature and data 
Besides from deploying reports from institutes and research centres, academic articles and reports 
we will use a broad range of news articles. We have done this in order to get a picture of the current 
situation in Myanmar, and especially to track down the core discussions among the conflicting 
parties. The news articles have been our access to the current events and allegations since it is very 
much an on-going process where new and important incidents happen almost every day at the 
moment. This has also made it challenging for us to get a full grip of the levels of the conflict and 
the process of establishing peace, but fortunately we have had the possibility to include central 
informative reports that were published just as we were starting up the writing process (MPSI 2014, 
Johnson and Liduaer 2014 and BNI 2014 – all from March/April). These of course have an inherent 
risk of being biased or only telling part of the story; we have been aware of this, as we believe that it 
is always a condition in the study of social phenomena. The news articles that we use come from 
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different media platforms; some international, some national and some administered by the ethnic 
minorities themselves. We hope to have been able to spread out the selection of our sources, in order 
to make a more or less equal representation of the diverging voices in the Myanmar peace process. 
We believe that it will always be a condition in analyses of the societal not being able get ‘the full 
picture’: a conflict – as well as any other incident – will always have more narratives and truths 
depending on who you ask.  
Of other types of material, we have deployed official documents from the conflicting parties. These 
have given us an idea of the foundational ideas of the parties respectively, on which they build their 
statements.   
 
As a way to get into the field we had a conversation with a person who lives in Myanmar and is 
currently close to the peace process. Through this person, who somehow came to function as our 
gatekeeper, we were presented to important points, perspectives and central sources for more 
knowledge. All were aspects that we then could follow up on afterwards in order to get deeper into 
the field and the context. The person wished to be anonymous.  
 
Delimitation 
In order to focus our study and be able to answer our research question we have had to make some 
choices and opt aspects out. One of them was on the category ‘ethnic groups’. When we refer to 
‘ethnic groups’ in the report we put the many ethnic minorities under the same umbrella, even 
though we are aware, that it may not entail all ethnic groups. Furthermore there is a difference 
between the ethnic armed groups, and the ethnic groups that are not armed, but have another type of 
institution or organization. Marte Nilsen, a PRIO researcher who has followed Myanmar, writes 
about the ethnic groups, ”although the main political objectives of each ethnic nationality in 
Myanmar are by and large the same (federalism, self-determination and religious and cultural 
rights), their viewpoints and this their strategies to achieve these objectives may alter significantly” 
(Nilsen 2013: 124). She explains us that most ethnic minority people do not participate in armed 
struggle, but work for their political goals by other means (ibid.). Though, despite differences in 
strategies, history, geography and relation to the ruling elite, the ethnic groups are relatively united, 
she also states (ibid.: 127). In regards to our focus on statehood and the central claims from the 
ethnic minorities on self-determination, federalism and a reform of the 2008 constitution, we have 
not found fundamental differences between the ethnic groups, either armed nor not-armed.  
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When we say ‘the government’ it sometimes also include ‘the army’, and other times the 
government and the military might not share the same position. An example that shows the 
increasing difference between the two institutions (that were still recently one and the same 
institution) is that during the last years, the president has three times ordered a halt to the fighting in 
Kachin state, but the military has ignored the orders (Nilsen 2013: 128). Though we still believe that 
they share most interests and still work closely together; Yash Ghai (2008), Marte Nilsen (2013) and 
International Crisis Group (ICG 2014b) back up this argument. The government, led by the former 
military general Thein Sein, has to take care of not only security issues, but also the political and 
economic challenges indeed. Furthermore the grievances expressed by the ethnic groups are mostly 
directed towards the government. This is why we have chosen to focus on the government as the 
conflicting party to the ethnic groups.  
 
1.5 Theoretical framework for analysis 
 
Conflicts all over the world have increasingly been brought to international attention and put on the 
agenda of the United Nations (UN), as well as it has become a preoccupation of human rights and 
development organizations. Global actors have thus increasingly been involved in solving these 
conflicts, with different incentives and agendas, though always in some way or another connecting 
international ideas to local grievances. This chapter is a presentation of a selection of the extended 
literature on external third party involvement in intra-state conflict resolution, pointing out some key 
concepts and understandings for our analysis. Authors referring to will be Wallensteen (2012), 
Ramsbotham et al (2005), Svensson (2009), Bell (2006) and Armengol (2012). Involvement of third 
party actors, especially as mediators or facilitators in peace negotiations, and maybe even biased 
mediators, will, according to the experiences in most cases lead to more positive outcomes of peace 
than no existence of external third parties. At least this seems to be the consensus of the selected 
theorists, even though focus on the role and what they can contribute with is diverging. To this we 
will then, in the end, present some critical approaches to what some has called the “peace building 
consensus”, which will give a more critical perspective to external involvement in local conflicts. 
Here we will refer to Richmond (2006), Paris (2002) and Goetschel and Hagmann (2011). 
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Types of third party involvement 
The distinction between the different roles of third parties does not appear completely clear when 
reviewing the literature, a point also confirmed by Bell (2006: 400). Though according to Vicenc 
Armengol (2013) it is possible to draw some distinctions between the different kinds of actors. 
There are even, according to him, functions that third parties ‘should’ perform in order to contribute 
positively in a peace process, which makes him the most explicit normative of the authors we have 
chosen to include in this section. His contribution goes as following: 
The first actor represented in a peace process is the explorer who is the one exploring whether the 
conflicting parties are ready to start the negotiations. The explorer has contact with both parties and 
can act as some kind of messenger to make the parties get in indirect contact with each other, but is 
on the other hand required to maintain confidentiality.  
When both parties are convinced to start the negotiations the convener plays an important role. The 
convener can be a person with prestige in society, for example a member of the church or a regional 
or international body. The tasks for this person can be to form a public document declaring the 
beginning of the talks. The convener can sometimes continue in the role as facilitator. Adding to the 
confusion about facilitator and mediator he explains, “the so-called mediator is, in fact, a central 
figure in the process, who is known as the facilitator” (Armengol 2013: 4). When the peace talks 
reach this level, the facilitator is ready to step in and sit at the negotiation table in order to help find 
a solution. According to Armengol there are certain requirements for the facilitator: “he/she must 
have an understanding of the problem; must be willing to persevere; and must be neutral, impartial, 
patient, empathetic and imaginative” (Armengol 2013: 5). Furthermore it is important that the 
facilitator does not impose solutions, but in stead helps the parties to reach a sustainable agreement. 
The role of the facilitator, he continues, cannot stand alone in the process but is depending on other 
actors to help support the process. At the negotiation table a witness should also be present. A 
witness, sometimes also called an observer, is an objective external actor and is present at the 
negotiations in order to solve disagreements on the way. The witness can clear up 
misunderstandings and make sure the negotiations do not break down. A witness is neither a 
mediator nor a facilitator, but is only present for clarification (Ibid). According to Armengol it is a 
good idea to include an incentive in the process. The incentive could be an organisation or a country 
that can provide economic or political incentives to unblock the situation. The European Union has 
in some cases acted as the incentive and has offered economic support to make the negotiation 
continue (Ibid.: 6). 
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If one side of the conflict consists of more than one group, a unifier can help unite them in order to 
align their agendas, so there are as few frictions as possible (ibid.). 
The guarantor is the third party that makes sure and guarantees the parties that the terms of the 
agreement will be fulfilled. Even though it is the parties involved that in the end are responsible, it is 
beneficial to involve a third party in monitoring the agreements (Ibid.: 7). 
 
The role as the norm promoter 
An advantage of third party signatory in a peace agreement is that the parties are not only committed 
to each other, but also to the third party. Bell writes that “this commitment raises the compliance 
stakes for both state and non-state signatories, particularly when third parties view themselves as 
having an active norm promotion function” (Bell 2006: 401).  
Third parties can reinforce a role as norm promoters, also when it is not deliberate. This, according 
to Bell, might be the most significant role they possess (Ibid.: 400). Bell argues that the UN can be 
understood as a normative negotiator, referring to guidelines established for secretary-general 
representatives dealing with human rights constraints on peace agreements6. But the most active 
norm promotion will often come from religious mediators, she writes (Bell 2006: 401). Bell 
furthermore points to that non-state groups will often advocate for third parties’ participation in 
order to reach international legitimacy and give them better chances to resist their own local out-
bidders (Ibid.: 402).  
 
Impartiality or biased mediators? 
At first glance one would think that impartiality is always necessary in third party involvement, as 
Armengol (2013) explained just above. This, according to Wallensteen, is also confirmed by 
experience; parties to a conflict primarily want a mediator that is impartial to their position 
(Wallensteen 2012: 292). Though, Isak Svensson (2009) presents another perspective on this, also 
based on experiences. His overall argument is that biased mediation has shown to create more 
successful establishments of peace agreements than neutral mediation. His argument is based on 
statistical data collection and analysis on peace processes in a period from 1989-2004. He presents a 
set of conclusions. One is that if mediators are rebel-biased the likelihood of political power sharing, 
pacts and third-party security guarantees is increased. If mediators are biased towards government it 
                                                
6 This connotates with the message presented in Dykmann (2013) ’Only With the Best Intentions: International Organisations as Global 
Civilisers?’, in which it is argued that international organisations can be interpreted as agents of a ‘universal civilising mission’. It is 
exemplified with the international civil service, the UN human rights policy and the influence of non-western concepts on the civilising role 
of international organisations. Dykmann presents international organisations as the adequate institutions to observe or even guarantee 
world peace by bringing technological and social progress to all world regions (Dykmann 2013).  
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increases the likelihood of provision for territorial power-sharing pacts, government-sided amnesties 
and repatriation of civilians. Neutral mediators are often driven by a ‘truly humanitarian’ impulse, 
altruistic motivations and/or motivations to establish or keep a positive image and reputation (He 
gives Norway as facilitator in Sri Lanka as example). Neutral mediators lack the possibility to 
manipulate via financial (or other) support to one of the sides, whereas biased mediators can use 
“sticks and carrots”, as he argues. Another point presented by Svensson is that biased mediators will 
be more likely to make parties commit to reel concessions. If a party “only” wants to make conflict 
suspension (not resolution) they will most likely invite a neutral mediator into the process, he argues 
(Svensson 2009).  
Wallensteen might present a more “mainstream” or dominant way of approaching third parties and 
their role. In his chapter on third parties and mediation, it is described how UN and especially the 
secretary-general have played a central role in intra-state conflicts since the cold war. That the UN 
Security Council or the secretary-general chooses the mediator, or they themselves are mediators 
assures impartiality of the third part, he argues. This is, according to Wallensteen the most 
traditional form of third party mediation, and he underlines that approval or opposition to this choice 
by the conflicting parties is crucial to a successful appointment of a third party mediator 
(Wallensteen 2012: 290-291). When looking at the United States (US) as a mediator, impartiality 
and approval by all sides are not always assured; they are often driven by own interests and have its 
own agenda, he writes (ibid.:292). Thus according to Svensson, it is not necessarily a problem as 
also presented above; and in the case of partiality Svensson refers to the example of US mediating in 
the Israel-Palestine case, where the Palestinians accepted the US presence even though they were 
clearly biased towards Israel. This is explained by the fact that Palestinians saw the US as being to 
sole actor having enough power to be able to make Israel make concessions (Svensson 2009: 448). 
John Paul Lederach contributes to this assumption by stating that what the parties need from a third 
party is confidence (to their ability to succeed with the effort) more than neutrality (Lederach 1995 
in Ramsbotham et al. 2010: 169).  
 
Third parties can though also be found within the country; Wallensteen mentions individuals with 
religious roles, retired statesmen “or even businessmen” (Wallensteen 2012: 289) as persons with 
particular status who can ‘transcend the conflict divides’. In the case of Myanmar this has been 
deployed; local businessmen in the timber industry have brokered the peace talks and are now 
mediators between some of the dominant ethnic groups and the government. We will return to this 
in chapter 2.5.  
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On the potential for a fully domestically administered process Bell argues, “In rare cases, such as 
that of South Africa, transformation of the domestic order can be achieved through a domestically 
implemented fundamental reconstruction. In most cases, it cannot” (Bell 2006: 406). The opposite 
to this would be internationalization which can have many levels, but indicating that domestic 
functions are overtaken (more or less) in their entirety by international actors. That was what 
happened in East Timor in the exercise of international territorial administration (Wilde 2001 in Bell 
2006: 407). We will return to this in the discussion in chapter 3. 
 
Building liberal peace and its critiques 
Much critique has been posed to what could be summed up as the ‘the liberal peace paradigm’.  
According to Richmond (2006), the liberal peace’s main components are democratization, the rule 
of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neoliberal development. These, he argues, are 
increasingly being criticized from several different perspectives (Richmond 2006: 292). One strong 
voice comes from Roland Paris (2002), who states, “without exception, peace building missions in 
the post-Cold War period have attempted to ‘transplant’ the values and institutions of the liberal 
democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states” (Paris 2002: 638). Richmond 
makes a genealogical analysis of ‘the problem of peace’; looking at which understandings of peace 
it derives from. We do not wish to go deeper into this, though we find his argument that the liberal 
peace7 has come to be assumed generally as something acceptable to all (Richmond 2006: 292): a 
universal understanding of peace that everybody could subscribe to. The critique (as it is formulated 
by Paris at least) is not so much the specific ideas that the international peace builders come with, 
but the fact that scholars and peace workers tend to forget to focus on and question the “diffusion of 
norms and institutional models from one part of the international system to another” (Paris 2002: 
638) that the peace operations involve. This, he argues, have often been standards that define how 
states should organize themselves internally. He links this to his notion of mission civilisatrice, 
referring to the colonial belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ‘civilize’ the 
colonies they considered to be backwards in their development. As he argues, the contemporary 
practice of international peace building may be viewed as a modern rendering of the thinking from 
the colonial era. Paris further writes that it does not necessarily have to be other states and 
international organizations’ direct involvement in local conflicts that further this norm diffusion. He 
writes, “[a] second way in which peace builders have promulgated liberal norms, in addition to 
                                                
7 Even though it could be argued that there are similar understandings to what is called ’democratic peace’, as presented by Steve Chan 
(1997) and de Mesquita et al. (1999), it is not this kind of overall idea of peace (and its prospect for collapsing and turning into war) we 
wish to refer to here.  
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shaping the content of peace settlements, is by providing ‘expert’ advice to local parties in war-
shattered states during the implementation of these settlements” (Paris 2002: 644).  
Some of the same critique comes from Goethschel and Hagmann, who argue that peace has become 
increasingly bureaucratized and one-dimensional, driven by a project management logic 
administered by “Western peace and development experts working with an essentialist 
understanding of liberal peace” (Goethschel and Hagmann 2011: 46). They give the UN Agenda for 
Peace from 1992 as example of how the founding ideological reference for government-sponsored 
peace building across the globe was institutionalised (ibid.: 50), which then a decade later has 
become ‘commodified’ and professionalized by the international society, as they state (ibid.: 51). 
Goethschel and Hagmann sum up how they see the most influential “peace orthodoxy” of today as 
being 1) that peace is an uncontested idea, 2) that peace can be achieved by dint of planned 
interventions, and 3) that liberal democracy equals peace (Goethschel and Hagmann 2011: 53). The 
presented scholars all have a critical stance towards the international peace building ideas, though 
with different focuses and approaches. We find them relevant in this study in order to discuss the 
role of third parties in Myanmar, as well as the attitude towards them from the domestic actors. In 
particular we find their attention to how peace building also involve state building interesting, since 
that is part of our research objective and will be the focus of the last part of our analysis. 
 
Summing up 
In the first section of this outlining of our theoretical framework we have presented approaches to 
third parties in conflict resolution that can be considered “within the paradigm”, or at least, having a 
less critical and more pragmatic approach. Even though they have diverging views on the role of a 
third party in resolving an intra-state conflict, whether it is biased, unbiased or with a clear 
clarification of the roles, it is clear that the approaches outlined state that there is a tendency 
pointing towards third party involvement as beneficial for a peace agreement. Furthermore these 
third parties should preferably be international actors, according to the first mentioned scholars. In 
the light of this, we find it interesting to look at the recent peace negotiations in Myanmar, where 
international actors so far have been denied access (as anything else than witnesses) to the 
negotiation table. The debate around the liberal peace paradigm points to the importance of being 
aware and questioning the transmission of ideas and norms that come with international involvement 
in local peace processes. The ideas underlying the liberal peace paradigm and its instrumental 
approach to peace building have received a great amount of critique for its belief that Western 
institutional models can be applied to all local, and very different, contexts.  
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2. Analysis 
 
Before addressing the involvement of third parties in Myanmar, we will start with an overview of 
the historical events leading up to the opening of the peace talks in 2011. Central aspects of the 
conflict, as it has come to stand out today will be presented, including an outline of the central actors 
constituting the peace architecture in Myanmar. This will be followed by an analysis of the third 
parties involved, with a special emphasis on how the Burmese conflicting parties approach the 
involvement of external actors in the process, section 2.2. Then we will turn to the question of the 
diverging perceptions of the state, as we have identified this to be the core of the conflict, section 
2.3. The points presented in this chapter will all be integrated in the next chapter (3), where we will 
make a crosscutting discussion, in order to answer our research question. Now, a brief historical 
overview will be made, followed by more recent incidents and circumstances.  
 
2.1 Historical overview 
 
Understanding the history of Myanmar is a challenge and the complexity springs from decades of 
events with a military regime, ethnic diversity and the fight for self-determination. It would not be 
possible to describe all events influencing the current situation today; therefore we have chosen to 
outline events that seem crucial in understanding the involvement of third parties and the contested 
approaches to the definition of the state by the implied actors. Though we have made sure not to 
leave out other eventually crucial events that could change the overall picture of the historical 
context of Myanmar.  
 
In Myanmar there are 135 official acknowledged ethnic groups, where the majority is Bama (69 %) 
and lives in the central low-lying areas. The biggest remaining groups are Shan, Karen, Karenni, 
Chin, Mon, Rakhine and Kachin and are situated along the borders (South 2008: xv). 
The country was an independent state ruled by shifting ethnic minorities until it was incorporated in 
the British Empire in 1886. Until then there was a balance between the rights of the Barman 
majority to supremacy and the ethnic minorities’ right to self-determination (Smith 1991: 29).  
In 1922 the British colonizers separated the country in two areas – the central more developed low-
lying areas where the ethnic Burmese were situated called Ministerial Burma (MB) and the less 
developed areas along the border called Frontier Areas (FA). This division created a gap between 
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Barman majority and the remaining minority population because while the British were 
implementing reforms and creating a Burmese parliament in MB, the border areas were more or less 
left to self-governance and the power was placed at local authorities. According to the British 
colonizers this division was necessary because people living in the border areas were of a weaker 
race, and needed to develop slower with help from Christian missionaries (on this colonial thinking, 
see also Cooper 2005 and Stucktey 2011). MB was under political influence from the British 
democracy and was ruled as an Indian province. This ‘divide and rule’ policy meant that the 
different parts of the country were ruled very differently, which became even more clear when the 
British in 1923 implemented a parliamentary rule in the MB, but only with representatives from the 
ethnic Barman, because they considered representatives from FA unable to participate in democratic 
decisions. According to the Australian Research Advisor and Burma-expert Hazel Lang, already at 
this early state the foundation of the recent conflicts between the ethnic groups was made (Lang 
2002: 25). During World War II the British lost control over Burma, but the different ethnic groups 
understood the independence differently. For the Burmese in MB it was important to regain its 
power after the British dominance, while the ethnic groups in FA feared Burmese dominance in an 
independent state and the loss of their autonomy. At this time, it is argued by Matthew Walton8 
political organisations fighting for self-determination were created (Walton 2008: 893). 
In an attempt to establish a federal union, the Burmese general Aung San gathered the ethnic groups 
in order to make an agreement about partial self-determination and joint democracy. In 1947 this 
resulted in the Panglong Agreement, an agreement that laid the foundation for today’s wishes for 
self-determination and autonomy and what later gave name to the Panglong Spirit (Ibid.). We will 
return to the notion of the Panglong Spirit in chapter 2.3 of the analysis.  
Unfortunately Aung San was killed before the agreement became effective, and in stead the country 
got a turbulent start as an independent country. A new constitution created a system with a 
democratically elected parliament, but was immediately challenged by the ethnic groups who strived 
for the self-determination they were promised in the Panglong Agreement. They did not agree on 
Burma as a state with one central government, but instead they wanted to rule their own areas (Lang 
2002: 25). 
As a consequence of a weak civil government and constant insurrection against the state, the 
Burmese army Tatmadaw was founded, and the constant insurrection resulted in the government 
being depended on the army to maintain its power. In a fragile context of continuing riots and the 
                                                
8 Who is an American political scientist with speciality in politics and religion in Myanmar, currently Aung San Suu Kyi Senior Research 
Fellow in Modern Burmese Studies at St Antony’s College, Oxford University. 
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ethnic groups’ wish of withdrawing from the union, the military made a coup d’état in 1962 led by 
general Ne Win (Steinberg 2001: 185). 
The military regime suspended the constitution and instead created an authoritarian government 
with an isolationist agenda, including state control of the economy through a nationalisation of 
private companies and control of the prices. This new strategy led, according to Burma Watch, to 
oppression of the population and continuing damaging incidents that started to destroy the entire 
country (Burma Watch).  
In 1987 the situation in Burma worsened and the country was close to going bankrupt. In 1988 the 
people went to the streets demonstrating against the extreme political suppression and the fatal 
economic situation. The government responded with massive arrests and violent confrontations with 
the demonstrating people, which led to thousands of people being killed in the streets (ibid.).  
Despite the failed attempts to unseat the military government the fight for democracy continued and 
in 1990 Burma held a democratic election where Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of general Aung San) 
and her party National League for Democracy (NLD) won 80 percent of the seats in the parliament. 
Though the result was ignored and declared not valid and the government refused to hand over 
power. Instead Aung San Suu Kyi was, as was also the case with other opposition leaders, placed in 
house arrest.  
The military regime continued like before with offensives against the ethnic groups, and as a result 
of violence, landmines and guerrilla attacks on local communities, thousands of people were forced 
to flee (Burma Watch). 
In August 2003 the military regime laid out its “7-step road map” with the intension of moving the 
country towards more democratic, modern and developed conditions. Though, according to Marte 
Nilsen (2013) it at the same time “aimed to reinvent and maintain the political role of the military 
by making it constitutional and instituting a civilian government” (Nilsen 2013: 119). This was, 
according to Mary Callahan, the first steps towards the 2008 constitution (Callahan 2012: 121), 
which we will return to later. Though it might have been only on the façade, this marked the 
beginning of a state-controlled and top-down democratization of Myanmar (Nilsen 2013: 119).  
When the cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in July 2008, thousands of people suffered from the 
consequences of the worst cyclone Myanmar had experienced for decades. While communications 
in large part of the country was disrupted and the country was preoccupied by helping and securing 
the people who had survived the cyclone, the military regime held a referendum on the constitution 
they had prepared. Even though they were aware of the catastrophic situation in the country, 
according to professor Yash Ghai (2008) from University of Hongkong, they refused to postpone the 
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election on the constitution even though they knew a large part of the population would not be able 
to vote. Not surprisingly the result of the votes showed a majority of votes in favour of the 
constitution. According to Ghai, numerous reports showed that ballot papers were marked by state 
officials. Furthermore the people knew that they would be punished for voting against the 
constitution and very few had had the opportunity to read and fully understand the content of the 
constitution. Hence Ghai argues that the constitution was pushed through with a lot of cynicism and 
coercion from the military regime (Ghai 2008).  
 
Transition and invitation to peace talks 
The cyclone Nargis left the country in a terrible condition, and an abundant number of humanitarian 
organizations intervened to help the population who has lost their houses, cattle and income, 
Soubhik Ronnie Saha from Harvard writes (Saha 2011). But the consequences of the cyclone might 
also have forced the military regime to take a new turn in the political reform process that was 
already laid ground for with the new constitution. Its approach to other countries was also changing 
slowly, as it found itself in a situation, where it was dependent on the international society to resolve 
the humanitarian crisis, which came along with bad economic conditions after years of embargo that 
had excluded Myanmar of the global economy (Nilsen 2013). In 2011 Thein Sein was elected as 
president of Myanmar, and only months later he announced his ‘Invitation to peace talks’ in the 
national newspaper New Light of Myanmar. In this rather small news release (as in, of few words, 
not occupying much space) three points are mentioned: 
1. The Government firmly believes that the State hand in hand with the entire people, upholding Our 
Three Main National Causes, need to pursue regional development by putting an end to armed 
insurrection to make internal peace in order to build a peaceful, developed nation. 
2. As the first phase, those national race armed groups wishing to make pace through solutions to 
armed conflicts may contact the State or Region government concerned group-wise to launch 
preliminary programmes. 
3. Upon completion of the preliminary programmes, the government will form a team for peace 
talks. It is hereby announced that the government invites national race armed groups to peace talks.  
(New Light of Myanmar 2011). 
This marks the beginning of a transition of not only Burmese politics and governance but also 
society in general. A transition that is still very much in the making. The invitation of those willing 
to make peace by Thein Sein opens up what Christine Bell calls the pre-negotiation stage (Bell 
2006: 376-377). She explains that this stage typically revolves around how to get everyone to 
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negotiate together, with an agenda that they have all agreed upon. So for the ‘talk about the talks’ to 
begin, it is necessary to define who is going to negotiate and with what status. In the case of 
Myanmar the Army has limited the list of participating ethnic groups to contain the 16 biggest 
groups (even though there are 21 in total) (BNI 2014: 37 and English.Panglong.org 2014). This 
might show something in regards to the (definitional) power of the army; but it is meanwhile also a 
legitimization from the Army to the existence of, at least the biggest, ethnic groups. Bell writes that 
in this first stage, it is also where the release of political prisoners or the return of exiled negotiators 
happens. Aung San Suu Kyi was already released in 2010 (bbc.co.uk 2010), arguing for the 
placement of the initiation of the transition earlier than the peace talks in 2011, thus this is clearly a 
long stretched process and not possible to reduce to one specific date. The release of the 
oppositions-leader has since been followed by the release of many other political prisoners. Whether 
it fulfils Thein Sein’s promise to release all political prisoners at the end of 2013 (voanews.com 
2014) is a question that is still discussed inside and outside of Myanmar (ibid.).  
 
Ceasefires and proposals for peace 
Between 2011 and 2014 16 ceasefires between the government and the ethnic groups have been 
made or remade, as a new and more substantial round of ceasefires was initiated by Thein Sein and 
his Minister at President’s Office Aung Min (Nilsen 2013: 121). The signing of ceasefires belongs 
to the pre-negotiation stage as understood by Bell, and on this she notes that ceasefires typically take 
the form of bilateral agreements between some parties, and do sometimes remain secret until a later 
date (Bell 2006). A community worker from Shan state explains how he sees the bilateral character 
of the ceasefires, “'they [the ceasefire agreements] have all been individually agreed to, that's how 
they [the ethnic groups] are kept divided, all the ethnic groups have to join together if they want to 
be strong” (Bangkokpost.com 2012). Marte Nilsen points to the fact that now, with Aung Min’s 
ceasefire round, the agreements are written and firmly grounded in the government, whereas they 
before were oral agreements made mostly with individuals and not entire organisations (Nilsen 
2013: 121). Though they are still unilaterally made, the unifying nationwide ceasefire is still not 
signed. And a question is not only when it will happen, but also on which conditions. New violent 
confrontations have appeared between the Kachins and the government (meaning a break with a 17 
year old ceasefire) and clashes between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine state 
have erupted, just as the signing of ceasefires is at its highest (ibid.). So in order to make national 
reconciliation and establish a nationwide ceasefire these issues should definitely be resolved first. 
Meanwhile the ceasefire-groups and the government hold meetings occasionally in effort to make 
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progress with their peace plans. As far as we have been able to identify, the conflicting parties are 
still working on the basis of two distinct peace plans9; the ethnic groups want political dialogue 
assured as part of signing a nationwide ceasefire, whereas the government tend to focus more on 
ceasefire; then ‘development’; and then political dialogue (Nilsen 2013: 124). This type of 
negotiation approach is not unusual at this stage, according to Bell (2006). The plans are often 
written from each party’s perspective and understanding intending to create a context in which 
parties outside the established negotiation table might choose to participate, she writes. The 
agreements are mostly context-setting declarations, and do seldom use the language of obligation. 
Bell furthermore explains that the lack of formality in the documents at this stage also keeps the 
space open for crucial issues and commitments that can undermine “the move towards talks and give 
ammunition to dissenters or outbidders” (Bell 2006: 377). So far the Myanmar peace process has 
been going on almost three years, and reviewing the current news in the Myanmar media it seems 
that the wish and hope to agree on a nationwide ceasefire is shared by almost all stakeholders in the 
conflict (cf. forthcoming references), though it has still not happened yet. It is also noteworthy that 
persons who were earlier excluded to exile (as academics, rebels or other kinds of political refugees) 
have now returned to Myanmar, to take part in the peace process. The documentary made by Al 
Jazeera’s 101 East shows how former ‘enemies’ have now joined in the government’s peace team in 
the effort to bring peace to the country (101 East 2014), and indeed gives positive prospects for the 
future of Myanmar. Though there are indeed central obstacles that might still stand in the way, and 
be the reason for a second postponement of the signing of the unifying agreement: the continued 
fighting in the Kachin province and the lack of recognition of the Rohinyas from the Burmese 
authorities as being of Burmese nationality are indeed factors that challenge the confidence and 
further progress to the peace agreements (101 East 2014 and a broad range of news articles).  
 
Another obstacle, that might become a spoiler in the peace process, is the current controversy 
around the national census (ICG 2014a). For the first time in 30 years the population is to be 
counted, and the number of ethnicities to be reported, and this has created clashes and rivalries, that 
the International Crisis Group has deemed “highly controversial and deeply divisive” (ibid.: 1). In 
line with this is then the disagreement about whether or not the 2008 constitution should be the base 
for the discussion in the next stage, the political dialogue about the future of Myanmar. This is, as 
we will analyse in chapter 2.3, what basically encapsulates some of the most central concerns of the 
conflicting parties in Myanmar, and might be the core sticking point of the conflict. So to 
                                                
9 The Myanmar Peace Monitor has collected the proposed peace plans from respectively the government and the ethnic groups 
(mmpeacemonitor.org), and so far it looks as though they still present two diverging plans 
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understand the conflict we have found it crucial to scrutinize the 2008 constitution and the debate 
around it. Furthermore we have found it highly relevant to look at the actors taking part in the 
resolution of the conflict, since we believe that they can give us some perspectives on the nature of 
the conflict as well. It should be noted that until the beginning of the peace process, international 
actors were very restricted by Myanmar and not many were allowed to enter (Saha 2011). But with 
Thein Sein’s new turn, it seems that the approach to external actors has changed gradually. Today 
there is a great number of International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) in Myanmar, and 
they enjoy more freedom of action now than before (Saha 2011 and noedhjaelp.dk).  
 
The ‘peace architecture’ in Myanmar 
Among the organizations dealing specifically with peace in Myanmar there are also a number of 
international actors represented. A large range of actors constitutes this ‘peace architecture’. It is not 
completely clear to us how their influence and power are distributed, and how they are linked to 
each other. Though it seems to stand more or less clear that they are organized in ‘support groups’, 
respectively the Peace Donor Support Group (constituted by embassies and international donors10) 
and the International Peace Support Group (a forum for NGOs, international and local, active on 
peace issues11), which, especially the latter, can be considered the ‘experts’ that are rather criticized, 
as we will come back to later. Then there is the Myanmar Peace Centre, which is a secretariat 
established by the Government’s chief peace envoy Minister U Aung Min. It is funded by the 
European Union (EU), since the Burmese government has still not put the peace process on the 
national budget (East 101 2014; Nilsen 2013). It could be argued, when taking in the definition from 
Armengol (2013) that the EU is then the ‘incentive’ (cf. our theoretical framework), due to the fact 
that they have funded large parts of the establishment and administration of the Myanmar Peace 
Centre. Being the government’s institution for the peace talks it must be said to be an essential 
institution in order to facilitate the many discussions that the peace process entail, which have been 
made possible with the help from the EU. And in that way, the EU is in a position where it can use 
its financial support as an incentive to further a certain understand of peace building, if it would12.  
                                                
10 The Peace Donor Support Group was set up in June 2012 by the Government of Norway at the request of President U Thein Sein in 
order to provide a common platform for dialogue between the donor community and the Government of Myanmar, and to better 
coordinate the international community’s support of peace in general and the provision of aid in conflict-affected areas. The grouping is 
very loose and is not a pooled fund, but rather a mechanism for donors to communicate and coordinate their aid (BNI 2014: 81). 
11 It is an informal network of 20 members that holds a coordination meeting once a month in Bangkok. These include the International 
Crisis Group (ICG), Centre for Humanitarian dialogue (the HD Centre), Euro-Burma Office (EBO), Fairness International, The Border 
Consortium (TBC), Geneva Call, Transnational Institute (TNI), Nippon Foundation, Open Society Foundations, World Bank, and Shalom. 
It has a small secretariat that includes EBO’s Harn Yawnghwe (BNI 2014: 73). 
12 It would be interesting to dig further into this question, though as we have not found much information about the influence of EU or 
critical voices against it, so far we identified it as less controversial and important, and therefore we chose to leave it out, and instead 
focus on the role of Norway 
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Furthermore there are the coordination mechanisms for the ethnic groups (MPSI 2014: 4), the 
‘unifiers’ (Armengol 2013) of the many ethnic minorities’ (often) diverging interests (within an over 
all agreement about being in opposition to the National Army and government). The coordination 
mechanisms are, among others, The Nationwide Ceasefire Committee Team (NCCT) and The 
United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). They both aim to represent ethnic armed 
organizations when negotiating with the government’s peace negotiation team. According to BNI 
2014, the NCCT is expected to be temporary until the members sign the Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement, and will be replaced by another committee to write up the political framework and 
dialogue (BNI 2013: 210, 190). In all this we have found that MPSI stands out as a unique actor 
coming from outside, working with the mentioned domestic actors. MPSI has been established on 
request to Norway as a coordinator of all external humanitarian organizations active in the peace 
area, and very much has been said and written about them.  
 
Summing up 
In this chapter we have presented the historical and contemporary context in which the Peace 
Process Myanmar is placed. It has been shown how ethnic diversity has played a central role in 
history, and the question of the structure of the state. The colonial division of the country in Frontier 
and Ministerial areas has left its traces in the power structure in the aftermath, and attempts to re-
organize the country in a federal structure that gives the minorities a right to self-determination has 
shown deeply challenging. The military (Tatmadaw) took power in 1962 and through its one-party 
rule and nationalisations the country was left rather isolated to the rest of the world for decades. In 
the 2000s slow democratisations began, even though the military kept its power, and through the 
2008 constitution it was institutionalized, despite the fact that this constitution was also considered a 
step in the route to a liberalization of the military-regime’s power. As Thein Sein was elected 
president in 2011 he began a top-down led transition and opened up for peace talks between the 
fighting ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw. Ceasefires have been made with the great majority 
of the groups, political prisoners have been released and the country has been opened up to the 
outside world. The next steps, according to the plans, are the signing of a nationwide ceasefire with 
all groups and a political dialogue about the future state of Myanmar. We ended up with giving a 
brief overview of domestically involved actors in the peace process. As our focus of this study is the 
international influence in the Myanmar peace process, we will therefore now dig into the question of 
the involvement of third parties in the Burmese peace process.  
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2.2 The involvement of third parties 
 
“Norway has helped from the beginning, it is asked to continue its support, to see the end of an over 
60-year-long conflict” (Minister U Aung Min in Johnson and Liduaer 2014: 25). 
 
As we presented in previous section, Myanmar’s president Thein Sein initiated a government led 
transition and invited to peace talks with armed ethnic groups in 2011. Local businessmen took part 
in brokering the peace, making some of the central armed ethnic groups and the government talk 
together (Johnson and Lidauer 2014, bangkokpost.com 2012). In this chapter the third parties taking 
part in the current peace process in Myanmar will be analysed. We have identified that at this point 
in the peace process there is no external, i.e. international, representative acting as mediator. Though 
a key figure coming from outside is the Norwegian funded Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 
(MPSI) after an agreement with the Myanmar government. Mediation has so far been the task of 
domestic actors, and it seems that local businessmen have been the most prominent in this. 
Myanmar though has seen an increasing number of international actors working in the country, most 
of them being INGOs working with humanitarian issues in rural areas (Saha 2011). It could be 
argued that these actors also somehow can be seen as third parties, as the current peace process is 
not only negotiating a peace agreement between ethnic groups and the government, but is also 
resolving a long conflict and (re-)building a coherent society, including public services13. Though in 
this report we wish to focus on the actors taking directly part in the peace process in Myanmar, of 
which most have been established for this very purpose. We therefore now turn to the four actors we 
have selected to scrutinize due to the fact that they seem to be the most influential and active ones. 
First we will present the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, a Norwegian-facilitated peace 
supporter, and next the three business-associated internal mediators are presented. Then we will 
discuss the attitude towards these actors from the two parties in the conflict, as far as our access to 
these has allowed us. Finally we will discuss some of the critical notions that have been pointed 
towards MPSI concretely and on international peace builders more generally.  
                                                
13 Christine Bell (2006) presents this broader understanding of third parties, though pointing more directly at UN bodies taking on tasks 
that normally are seen as domestic affairs. We will argue that this focus on external involvement is important, also when it is not as 
official as would be the case with the UN, especially when addressing issues such as statehood and state building, which is also the aim 
with this report.  
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Norway is welcomed  
With the approach from the government to start the dialogue with the ethnic groups, participation of 
external actors was also initiated. In August 2012 president Thein Sein requested Norwegian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to help mobilize international support for the peace process – at least 
that is how it is explained by MPSI and the evaluators (MPSI 2014, Johnson and Lidauer 2014: 5). 
Though the Burmese dissident and human security researcher Maung Zarni explains it another way. 
He states that it was due to ”the Norwegian government’s success in persuading President Thein 
Sein and his government to accept Oslo’s involvement as a principled supporter and facilitator of 
Myanmar’s ceasefire/peace negotiations” (Zarni 2013: 2) that the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 
was initiated. Whether the initiative came primarily from Norway or Myanmar thus is not clear, but 
Zarni agrees with Johnson and Lidauer (and a row of other Myanmar researchers) that it is a major 
step in ‘the right direction politically’ that Norway is welcomed, in light of the military’s decades-
long intransigence against foreign involvement in the country (ibid.). With this it might be possible 
to call Norway a kind of explorer, as it is understood by Armengol (2013) (cf. our theoretical 
framework), they were present and had contact with both parties also before the initiation of the 
peace process (Irrawaddy.org 2014a), and might have had a role in inspiring the parties to put down 
weapons and start the peace talks.  
MPSI has through its two-year long existence achieved to ‘open up the humanitarian space’ and 
assure delivery of assistance to conflict-affected people to whom the humanitarian organizations 
before had very limited access, it says in the lessons learned report (MPSI 2014: 6). But there might 
be more to it than only facilitating aid and linking donors and local communities? In an independent 
review made of MPSI in March 2014 by Norwegian-based Nordic International Support Foundation 
it is stated that, “In positively responding to this request [from Thein Sein to help Myanmar] the 
Norwegian government took a considerable political risk that no other international actor was able 
or willing to take at this time.” (Johnson and Lidauer 2014: 5). What they precisely mean with 
taking a political risk is not clear, though we find it interesting that what is at least the understanding 
from the independent (Norwegian based) foundation is that Norway has involved itself in a risky 
business14. And looking at Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, East Timor and other peace processes were 
international involvement has not received notable positive acknowledgement, it could be argued 
that what might be at risk also this time is reputation and image (see for example Dodge 2013, Paris 
2002, Stokke 2010, Chopra 2002; Höglund and Svensson 2009 and unric.org). But in Myanmar 
                                                
14 See also Waage, H. H. (2004) “Peacemaking is a Risky Business”: Norway’s Role in the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1993-96.  
Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. 
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Norway has not been invited as a mediator as they were in e.g. the Sri Lankan peace process. 
According to Myanmar Peace Monitor15, “The current government peace committee is said to not 
want third parties involved at this stage of ceasefire talks” (Myanmar Peace Monitor)16. The wish 
from the government about not having international mediators involved in the peace talks seems to 
be respected from diplomatic Norwegian side. In a speech held in December 2012 Katja Nordgaard, 
the Norwegian ambassador in Myanmar, said, ”Of course, we are fully aware of the need for the 
fighting to stop across the country and for a genuine dialogue on political issues to begin. But, to be 
clear, Norway is not mediating in or facilitating the ceasefire talks” (Irrawaddy.org 2012). In stead 
the role of MPSI has been to facilitate trust building between the conflicting parties including testing 
the sustainability of the ceasefires. And as Zarni agues, “after Sri Lanka and Palestine, the initiative 
[MPSI] confirms the significant soft power Norway continues to possess as the world’s leading 
peacemaker” (Zarni 2013: 2). At the beginning no one quite knew what MPSI would do, it says in 
the external review of MPSI made in early 2014 (Johnson and Lidauer 2014: 20). In the beginning it 
was thought of as a short-term initiative. Over time, however, MPSI activities transitioned into 
longer-term support mechanisms (ibid.), and so far, it seems to be continuing even though it was 
deemed to end in April (dvb.no 2014a), which was also confirmed to us in a personal conversation 
with a resident in Myanmar, working with peace building. According to an article in Irrawaddy, 
Norway still believes it can play a role in the peace process, which they back up with a quote from a 
Norwegian official who said that his government, through its close ties “can influence the ministers 
and the government in Burma” (Irrawaddy.org 2014a). Of course Norway (as a state involved in 
another country) entails more than their one initiative MPSI, but we believe that MPSI is largely 
built on Norwegian ideas and values, and hence represent Norway as a foreign political actor quite 
well. In fact Norway also has other activities in Myanmar, as will also be dealt with, but MPSI is 
their most concrete effort to influence and support the peace process. So let us now take a narrower 
look at MPSI. 
 
The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative  
In concrete terms projects facilitated by MPSI in close cooperation with the ethnic groups have been 
to create forum for dialogue between different actors in local communities. Through listening 
projects and other consultations it has been aimed to build trust between the conflicting parties and 
                                                
15 Myanmar Peace Monitor, mmpeacemonitor.org, is also administered partly by Norway, according to a personal conversation with 
employee at international institution working with peace building in Myanmar  
16 This point was also explained to us by anonymous source familiar with the peace process, who said that Norway had been given “a 
tight mandate in relation to ceasefires”, meaning that they should not expect to mediate in the conflict. 
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assuring both sides of the sincerity of the opposite side. Furthermore MPSI has supported pilot 
projects implemented by ethnic groups and Community Based Organizations in order to help 
communities recover from the armed conflict. Some have focused on improvement of technical 
skills and equipment, whereas others have been more about empowerment and mutual 
understandings. Furthermore MPSI has assisted in providing ID-cards allowing conflict-affected 
people to travel freely and to access government services (MPSI 2014: 6; Appendix 1).  
With a point of departure in the above outlined activities of MPSI as an external actor in the peace 
process, it is possible to argue that their role in the peace process is limited to facilitating and 
supporting projects outside the political negotiation table. Though they, as a Norwegian based 
institution, combined with the fact that they have the former UN leader in Myanmar Charles Petri17 
at the wheel, possess experience with mediating in a peace process. They might also have wanted to 
do it if they were invited18. Though it is important to mention that Charles Petrie (the head of MPSI) 
has participated in the negotiations as an observer (what Armengol 2013 also refers to as a witness) 
on behalf of MPSI, so at least they have been present at important meetings (BNI 2014).  
According to an article on Irrawaddy, Norway was already involved in Myanmar before the 
insertion of Thein Sein as president19 (Irrawaddy.org 2014a), having ties with both the military 
regime and the democratic opposition, and has long supported the gradual transition process before 
the opening of peace talks. This might make it possible to consider Norway as a figure that we 
could, referring to Armengol (2013) could call the explorer. This actor explores whether the 
conflicting parties are ready to start the negotiations, acting as some kind of messenger to make the 
parties get in indirect contact with each other, but is on the other hand required to maintain 
confidentiality (ibid.). When looking at their connections to both parties in the early stage of 
transition it can be argued that they played a role in the creation of the ripe moment for peace talks. 
 
Furthermore, Norway might even take on a more dominant role in the future stages of the peace 
process20, if they are allowed and if there can be made room for them, which is also a point 
presented in the recent article from Irrawaddy (Irrawaddy.org 2014a). So far, reviewing their project 
catalogue they have mostly worked in local communities with efforts that have many similarities 
with “ordinary” NGO work. That they have put development before political dialogue has also been 
a point especially ethnic groups have criticized them for. But before we turn to the critique that has 
                                                
17 He is according to Zarni a “capable veteran of the UN with his distinguished service in Myanmar” (Zarni 2013: 2) 
18 At least referring to Höglund and Svensson (2009) they are preoccupied with maintaining an image of themselves as being the global 
peacemaker 
19 Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and Norway also funded Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), allowing the 
opposition radio and television station to broadcast from Oslo. And before the democratic transition initiated by the military regime began 
in 2011 Oslo signalled a willingness to move closer to the repressive military regime (Irrawaddy.org 2014a) 
20 This was at least a point made by an anonymous person familiar with MPSI and the peace process (personal conversation April 2014) 
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been posed towards MPSI we will now turn to a presentation of the three Burmese peace mediators.  
 
Local Businessmen mediating in peace talks 
The Myanmar state has thus not wanted Norway, or any other external actor to mediate in the peace 
talks. Though, we have identified other third party actors who have been actively involved in the 
political dialogue as brokers and mediators between the ethnic groups and the government. They 
might also be called the conveners, as it is understood by Amengol (2013): individuals with prestige 
in society that make the conflicting actors declare their will to enter the peace talks, who often 
continue as facilitators (ibid.). These actors are Dawei Princess Company, Peace Talk Creation 
Group and Egress, all associated with business in Myanmar. According to Myanmar Peace Monitor 
the role of the three actors has been first to broker peace talks, and later participate as mediators in 
the political dialogue during the ceasefire negotiations, especially between the Myanmar 
government and two of the dominant ethnic groups, respectively Kachin Independence Organization 
(KIO) and Karen National Union (KNU) (Myanmar Peace Monitor). We find the fact that 
businessmen, who have vested interests in industrial or resource extraction in Myanmar, are 
mediating in the peace talk very interesting21. Moreover it is also interesting in the light of the 
exclusion of external actors as mediators (as for example Norway, even though they possess 
experience and competences as mediators). It has not been easy for us to get access to in-depth 
information about the role and involvement of the three business-associated mediators participating. 
Literature on peace processes reminds us that secrecy is not unusual in peace processes (Bell 2006), 
and since the peace talks are taking place just in the moment of writing this, we have limited access 
to the discussions going on or the achievements reached. Though we have been able to find some 
relevant information in order to dig into their role and position, which is what will be done in the 
following.  
 
The Dawei Princess is a mining, construction and timber company working in the KNU controlled 
area Dawei district in Karen State. They have been involved mainly in the peace talks between the 
KNU and the Myanmar government (daweiprincess.biz.mm), firstly as brokers22 and now as 
mediators. According to the Managing Director U Ngwe Soe they are driven by a real wish to 
                                                
21 This has happened before, at least according to Wallensteen who states that ”even businessmen” (Wallensteen 2012: 289) can 
‘transcend the conflict divides’ and therefore be chosen to mediate in a conflict that is not directly on their matter, as they are persons 
with particular status 
22 This is confirmed by the KNU's General Secretary, Naw Zipporah Sein, who explained that the Dawei Princess Company has been 
involved in the peace process negotiations from the beginning: ''The Dawei Princess Company made the first contact with the KNU and 
initiated the meeting between the KNU and the government at the federal level with Railway Minister U Aung Min' (Bangkokpost.com 
2012) 
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establish everlasting peace, and do not expect any compensation; it should be seen as a donation and 
free from efforts to create private profit (daweiprincess.biz.mm). Though, met with allegations from 
ethnic groups, the director admits that a peaceful Myanmar would be advantageous for all 
businesses: ‘‘every sector will benefit from peace - tourism, agriculture, mining, business,'' he writes 
(Bangkokpost.com 2012). But he also underlines, that the criticisms from the community groups are 
not valid. ”Our primary concern is negotiating for peace only - not business. We are there as peace 
negotiators only. Business at this time is not our primary concern” (ibid.). Furthermore it is 
interesting how he somehow reduces his role and influence in that he states on the webpage of 
Dawei Princess, ”we also not qualified persons and have no authority or say in the discussions” 
(daweiprincess.biz.mm). Though, according to Johnson and Lidauer (2014), it seems certain that 
Dawei Princess has possessed a rather important role in the peace process until now, but are they 
biased, and if they are, towards what? They present themselves as being neutral, even though they 
are physically placed in a KNU controlled area. The managing director states that he does not get 
any financial benefit from the KNU for being involved in the peace negotiations, and that “We are 
on amicable relationship with the personal of both the government and KNU”. Their explanation to 
why they possess the role as peace negotiators, being a company working with construction, mining 
and timber, seems to be that no one else took the responsibility. As he states, they took the 
responsibility for those who were, as they were themselves, doubtfully and suspiciously waiting to 
see if the peace negotiations were really progressing, assuring the reader that they “are not heroes” 
(daweiprincess.biz.mm). So he indirectly denies to be allied to KNU, even though the company is 
located in a KNU controlled area. Then, as businessmen they might be allied to some extent with the 
government according to the wish for stability in order to restore the economy, and thus follow an 
economic agenda. But before digging deeper into the question of bias the other two organizations 
mediating in the peace process will be presented.  
 
Egress is a Yangon situated NGO, which is, according to the general secretary Naw Zipporah Sein 
of KNU, run by businessmen and academics (Bangkokpost.com 2012). Its president Tin Maung is 
also vice-president of the Myanmar Fisheries Federation, and the vice-president, Hla Maung Shwe, 
is as well vice-president of the Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The 
KNU general secretary believes that “Myanmar Egress acts as an adviser to the government”, even 
though she is still not fully aware of their role, as she said ”but the government has not yet officially 
explained its role to the KNU'' (ibid.). According to the extensive report from March 2014 
‘Deciphering the Myanmar Peace Process’ (BNI 2014), Egress is also a part of the government-
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initiated Myanmar Peace Centre23. The centre was opened in Yangon as part of an agreement with 
the Norwegian-led Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG), and was established to assist the Union 
Peacemaking Central Committee and the Union Peacemaking Work Committee in the peace process 
(BNI 2014: 205). So in conclusion it must be argued that Egress, being part of the government 
established Peace Centre, to a large extent work in close connection with the government, as well as 
they also posses a blueprint from Norway, cf. the agreement between Myanmar and Norway on 
opening the Peace Centre.  
 
The last of the mediators that we have identified is The Peace Talk Creation Group (PTCG). It was 
founded in 2012 and is headed by a Kachin businessman (Yup Zau Hkaung) of the Jadeland 
Company, along with other Kachin businessmen. It was founded to assist ceasefire negotiations 
between government and KIO, and according to Burma News International ”good relations with 
both sides have allowed them to play an important role initially as a broker and now as a facilitator 
for peace talks” (BNI 2014: 72). PTCG are witnesses in the 11-Point Common Position of Ethnic 
Resistance Organizations on Nationwide Ceasefire, and has held several meetings with the 
government and KIO, both formal and informal, according to a database of meetings held in the 
peace process, made by the BNI (2014: 121-123). The webpage of PTCG has been suspended, but 
they have a Facebook page aiming at, with their own words, “keeping the public updated with 
actual developments in the peace agreement” – though last post is from February 2013. In their 
profile they write that they are a group that “gives voluntary goodwill services and serves as a 
platform to promote and encourage peace talks between the Union Government and the Kachin 
Independence Organization (K.I.O) in order to ultimately pacify military conflict and hostility” 
(Peace Talk Creation Group – Facebook). So even though they might not be so active at the 
moment, they seem to have played a central role in their participation in the early stage of the peace 
process.  
 
Business-biased, government-biased or? 
The question whether the above-described third party actors then can be seen as biased is not 
straight forward to answer. Being businessmen they on the one side may have their own agenda: 
political stability to create economic prosperity. According to the definition of Svensson (2009) 
about biased and neutral mediation it can be argued that the businessmen acting as third party 
mediators in Myanmar are ‘neutral’, meaning not-biased towards either government nor the ethnic 
                                                
23 Myanmar Peace Centre is, as we have mentioned before, financed by the EU 
 29 
groups, but having their own agenda and motives for establishing peace. Though, on the other hand, 
they seem to be closely connected to the government as advisors and mediators, allowed by the 
government. Though they also seem to be somehow connected directly with one specific ethnic 
group respectively, which could point to some bias towards these. They are, as far as we know, local 
businessmen from minority provinces, and might therefore have a bias towards helping their own 
local community. At least it does not stand clear which agenda they further if not only their ‘own’, 
which must be characterized as economic. One thing that can be concluded is that they at least have 
insensitives that go beyond what a UN body (or eventually another external state) would have (see 
Bell 2006). The perspective from Svensson points towards the fact that biased mediators will often 
be able to establish arrangements in which the conflicting actors are more likely to make more 
thoroughgoing concessions, than if it was neutral mediators (Svensson 2009). So if the businessmen 
were biased mediators (either towards government or ethnic groups), their existence would (at least 
theoretically) not be that ‘bad’ after all when the wish is to establish long-lasting peace. 
 
Then it becomes interesting to ask on which motives Norway, with their rather ‘unique’ initiative24 
have entered the Myanmar peace process? It is tempting to refer to arguments presented by others 
(Stokke 2010, Kelleher and Taulby 2006, Höglund and Svensson 2009) about Norway’s (earlier) 
motivations about preserving their image as the ‘global peacemaker’. Having ambitions that are 
solely individual (such as the country’s own reputation) would make them a neutral actor according 
to the understanding of Svensson (2009). Though ethnic groups (and Myanmar scholars) have 
criticised MPSI for being allied with the government’s agenda on ‘economic development first’ 
(MPSI 2014: 10; Zarni 2013), which therefore has made MPSI attentive about not trying to “buy 
peace”, as they write (MPSI 2014; Johnson and Lidauer 2014).  It might be that the MPSI director 
Charles Petrie is right when he states that their financial contribution is too small to make a 
difference or make the situation worse than it already is (dvb.no 2014a). But this was said in a 
context where the prospects for MPSI were that it was going to shut down (January 2014), but now 
it seems that Norway has decided to prolong the initiative (personal conversation)25. This points to 
the fact that, in the end, the Norwegian evaluation has been positive in regards to MPSI’s 
contribution in positively establishing peace in Myanmar. And with this it points to the fact that 
                                                
24 ”It was also quite a unique arrangement in comparison to other peace-making processes internationally” (MPSI 2014: v) 
25 Though, according to the Myanmar critic and writer, Muang Zarni, in light of the negative appraisal of MPSI, ”the MPSI should be 
temporarily halted until adequate steps are taken to assess its status and make it more transparent, inclusive and strategic” (Zarni 2013: 
1) 
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Norway has intentions to stay active in the peace process in Myanmar26. Its economic interests in the 
country could also explain this; after a little research on Norwegian business aspirations in Myanmar 
it becomes clear, that Norway has also been active in the economic area. Just recently the 
Norwegian Telenor Group has signed an agreement with Myanmar for a nationwide 
telecommunications license (TelenorMyanmar.com), and the Norwegian oil company Statoil has in 
March 2014 got permission to search for oil in a huge field in the sea belonging to Myanmar 
(Shippingwatch.dk). So it might be possible to argue that, besides having motives of strengthening 
their image as being the global peacemaker and building up their soft power in international 
relations, they are also driven by economic motivations. And as the Norwegian journalist and 
political scientist Stig Arild Petterson writes, through its economic investments combined with the 
peace support and a huge debt relief, Norway also positions itself as an influential actor being able 
to use its ‘sticks and carrots’. He sums up that “few should doubt that this is modern global politics 
of interests in practice27” (minervanett.no 2013). And possessing great influence in 
telecommunications and oil extractions, besides their peace support initiative, they must be well on 
the way28.  
 
Based on the above-presented analysis it is though possible to state that Norway has played a central 
role in the peace and transition process of Myanmar, even though being outside the political 
negotiations. We can also conclude that three different organizations take part as third party 
mediators in the current Burmese peace process. Though the doubt about their work and influence 
that we have seems to be shared by the ethnic groups (Bangkokpost.com 2012). We will now turn to 
the perception of third parties from the ethnic groups, as well as the government.  
 
The ethnic attitude to external involvement 
Due to distrust between the government and the ethnic groups, a demand has been put forward by 
the ethnic groups that there must be external observers present at the negotiations (BNI 2014: 75). 
They insist, “foreign mediators are necessary in ensuring that the government keeps to the terms of 
agreement” (Myanmar Peace Monitor)29. The ethnic groups have stated that they will only sign a 
ceasefire agreement if international observers are present at the talks (and some point directly to 
observers from the United Kingdom and US) (BNI 2014: 75). Christine Bell presents this “well-
                                                
26 The article ”Questioning Oslo’s Embrace of Burma” from Irrawaddy from 9th of May 2014 sums up the Norwegian aspirations in 
Myanmar, showing close ties that go back to the former military-regime, but also point to a challenge about choosing side, since Norway 
has also supported the democratic forces (Irrawaddy.org 2014a) 
27 Translated from Norwegian, ”men få må være i tvil om at dette er moderne, global interessepolitikk i praksis” (minervanett.no 2013) 
28 This is also a point in the article from Irrawaddy, Questioning Oslo’s Embrace of Burma (Irrawaddy 2014a) 
29 But NCCT (ethnic groups) only want incumbent leaders of foreign countries (elevenmyanmar.com 2014)   
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known” position from non-state groups, underlining how participation of external third parties can, 
in the perspective from the non-state groups, assure international legitimacy and guarantee 
compliance (Bell 2006: 402). Though it is not as simple as that; at least the ethnic groups have posed 
rather heavy criticism towards MPSI, as they were also doubting if they could trust it or not (Zarni 
2013).  
Recently (May 9th 2014) the Myanmar media platform Irrawaddy questions the Norwegian 
embracement of Myanmar, and points to the two-faced incentives from the Nordic country, ”Among 
Burma’s democrats and dissidents many quietly wonder if Norway had a change of heart. Some 
question the need for an oil-rich nation like Norway to seek business deals in Burma” 
(Irrawaddy.org 2014a). The journalist refers to a statement from a prominent Kachin ethnic leader 
on how he considers the Norwegian approach to the peace process as ”’Taw Tha Htay,’ an 
expression meaning a wealthy person from a remote area with limited understanding” (ibid.). As 
Johnson and Liduaer also evaluates, “In part this [critical attitude to Norway] was due to a deep 
mistrust of the new government and its peace process, and with that a belief that any agency 
supporting this was wrong” (2014: 4). It should be remembered that the great majority of the 
Myanmar population has lived their whole life in a context of civil war. A context that created a lot 
of distrust and fear, which is also one of the messages of the documentary made by Al-Jazeera (East 
101 2014), published at the webpage of Peace Donor Support Group. 
 
The ethnic groups also point to the fact that they are very unsure of the role of the current peace 
mediators (Dawei Princess, Egress etc.), mentioning that many of the peace mediators have close 
ties to the government, even though the government has not yet officially explained their role to 
them (Bangkokpost.com 2012). KNU's General Secretary Naw Zipporah Sein and Than Khe, the 
chairperson of the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), are concerned that business 
leaders have unlimited access to the peace negotiations. They ask for more knowledge on their role 
and policy; as Tahn Khe explains it: ”Business has a different agenda. The political problems have 
to be resolved first - business can come after'' (ibid.). In the article on Bangkokpost it is stated that 
Karen community groups allege that the presence of companies like Dawei Princess Company 
create a potential conflict of interest, and that they therefore should be prevented from being present 
at the peace talks table. 
Furthermore the ethnic groups do not seem to like that ‘Myanmar experts’ end up having a lot of 
influence on Myanmar’s politics. It could be argued that MPSI falls under that category as well, 
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though it covers more generally the abundant number of scholars working on Burmese issues30. 
Than Khe (chairperson of the ABSDF, Burmese Student Front) does not like how ’Myanmar 
experts’ get to present their options and opinions on how to ‘read’ his country's recent reforms. He 
says ''There are now many of these so-called experts and scholars talking about what is right for 
Burma. These people have not earned the right to have an opinion about what is right for the 
people'', and he continues, ''many are cronies, working to put themselves in a position to fill their 
pockets” (Bangkokpost.com 2012).  The Karen News has published a row of cartoons to portray this 
allegation in a satirical way, e.g. the cartoon titled ‘An academic fairy tale’ (Karennews.org, see 
image below). Here the “nameless, faceless ethnic sources” are standing on a crossroad doubting 
whether to follow the way to ‘liar’s bluff’ or ‘Burma’s academic honey pot’ (which in fact is in both 
directions). The ethnic people call themselves ‘sources’, referring to them being the objects of the 
academics who “have come to tell your plight to the world”, producing huge books and collections 
on human rights reports that have, in the cartoon, turned into a monster like being (ibid.).  
 
(Karennews.org) 
                                                
30 Some are Myanmar citizens in exile, others who have returned, as well as a great number of foreign scholars. As an example can be 
mentioned the existence of Modern Burmese Studies at St Antony's College (Oxford, England), headed by Matthew Walton (Aung San 
Suu Kyi Senior Research Fellow), http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/fellows/walton.html  
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So even though the ethnic groups call for international presence in the peace talks to assure 
compliance and international commitment to the agreement from the conflicting party, they also do 
not like when external actors and expert have influence and get to dictate the way for them to go.  
 
The government’s attitude to external involvement 
This allegation is also heard from official political side; the government does not want too much 
international influence. This is seen in that the question of national sovereignty is heard very often31, 
even though the only statements from the government we have been able to find on the topic are of 
very diplomatic and ‘empty’ character. Though the diplomatic tone, we would argue, also indicate a 
shift in Burmese foreign policy; they wish to establish better relations with the international 
community in order to enter the global economy (Thein Sein was the first Burmese president who 
visited US since 1966, The Guardian 2013). Though still they wish to preserve the control on 
domestic issues (see also Bell 2006: 404 on tasks that are considered essentially domestic), e.g. 
when the constitution will be opened for discussion and possible amendment; Thein Sein expresses 
this as, "The amendment of the constitution and the holding of free and fair elections are domestic 
issues which will be carried out within a legal framework and without tarnishing national 
sovereignty," (Global Times 2014). And then, as part of the underlying argument in the research 
focus of this report, the Burmese government has not allowed any international actor to possess a 
real political role in the peace work by acting as mediator.  
 
Third parties as guarantors and norm promoters 
The resistance to giving external actors real influence might make sense when taking in perspectives 
from other experiences on peace processes where third parties have had a dominant role (Stokke 
2010, Chopra 2002; Höglund and Svensson 2009 and unric.org). Even though a third party only 
possesses and exercises soft power, it still has a noteworthy role of norm promotion we argue. 
Unfortunately we are not able to study the norms of MPSI in close and question how they can be 
understood as representing ‘the international community’; that would be a whole new study. Though 
they are to a large extent based on the principles within the international New Deal Framework 
(MPSI 2014: 28-32). And referring to Christine Bell and her notion on norm promotion of third 
parties (Bell 2006: 401), it would be possible to argue that acting as trust-builders and facilitators of 
dialogue indeed gives MPSI influence on the process, since it creates the frame for the 
                                                
31 In the inauguration speech (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Myanmar), 2008 constitution and very recently (Global Times 2014) this notion 
is underlined heavily by Thein Sein 
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communication based on norms inherent in MPSI. Bell also argues how religious leaders have often 
had the role as norm promoters in peace processes (ibid.). Desmond Tutu in South Africa might be 
the most high-profiled example on this. But this is not the case in Myanmar. Here religious 
representatives are excluded from the political sphere (jf. Constitution’s article 121 ‘Disqualification 
for the Pyithu Hluttaw32 Representatives’, 392 ‘Election of People’s Representatives to the 
Hluttaws’), even though religion has long played a central role in Myanmar, as well as in the 
internal conflict33. Scholars representing the critical approach to peace building, such as Roland 
Paris (2002) and Goetschel and Hagmann (2011) would also to a large extent refer to international 
actors as possessors of such a role as the norm-promoters. Their argument is that there is a need to 
“engage more critically with the overly technocratic, prescriptive, and instrumentalist conceptions” 
(Goetschel and Hagmann 2011: 58) within contemporary peace building. Richmond argues that the 
current ‘peace consensus’ is a form of rehabilitation of imperial duty, and includes a liberal 
imperative, which is dominant within the epistemic community, in its construction of liberal peace. 
Peace-as-governance is often presented as a temporary installation, but can end up as external long-
term governance. Though Richmond at the same time states that peace without external governance 
may not be achieved, and then, we are back to the position of Armengol (2012) and Isaksson (2009). 
It should thus also be noted that the critique put forward by Paris and Goetschel and Hagmann might 
be directed towards peace building operations that are more dominated by the international society 
(often through UN intervention) that is the case with Myanmar. Anyways we find their perspectives 
and critiques relevant in our analysis. Looking at the Norwegian official discourse on their 
influence, it becomes evident, as we also mentioned above, that they are inspired by the Busan New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal 2013). The New Deal is elaborated by the g7 and 
a group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries and according to the basic principles “proposes 
key peace building and state building goals, focuses on new ways of engaging with a focus on 
country led processes and identifies commitments to build mutual trust and achieve better results in 
fragile states” (New Deal 2013). We would like to underline the ‘focus on country led processes’ as 
a central component of the New Deal framework. In the report on lessons learned of MPSI, the last 
chapter deals with how the New Deal is relevant for MPSI, and how the New Deal can learn from 
MPSI experiences. And other places in the report, it furthermore stands out as important for MPSI to 
present them self as having fully accepted and agreed with the decision from official Myanmar to 
                                                
32 Hluttaw means ‘council’ or ‘house’, in this case referring to the national House of Representatives which is the lower house of the 
bicameral legislature in Myanmar  
33 This is also connected to the rivalry around the recent census (ICG 2014), and a current example is the rivalries between Buddhists 
and Muslims in Rakhine State, see for example the article Burma: government denies Buddhist mob killed Muslim women and children, 
The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/myanmar-government-denies-buddhist-mob-killed-muslims 
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not include external actors in the negotiations. This is, as an example, explained by MPSI in the 
following quote “fundamentally the peace process is indigenous to Myanmar, locally owned and 
led, with limited roles for international intervention” (MPSI 2014: 26). By this, MPSI presents a 
benevolent and distanced approach, which at the same time can give them the possibility to excuse 
themselves from eventual failure of the peace efforts. We wish to return to this in chapter 3.  
 
Summing up 
This chapter has argued that MPSI seems to be a key supporter of the current peace process, and an 
actor that could have had the role as mediators if they were allowed. In line with Kristian Stokke 
(2010: 165) we find that the Norwegian peace engagement approach revolves around a particular 
form of soft-power involvement supported by aid-funded peace building in local communities, 
combined with a more diplomatic and economic alliance to the government, somehow giving them 
the possibility to hedge their bets. Though in this they might also risk challenging their potential for 
possessing the role as the trust-worthy external actor in the eyes of the ethnic groups, that would 
give them the possibility to take on the role as mediator in the next stages of the process.  
In regards to this, the government attitude towards MPSI seems to be that they want them to 
continue the work, though still outside the actual peace negotiations. This points to pragmatic 
economic rationales, knowing that the government until January 2014 had not included expenses to 
the peace process in the national budget (BNI 2014: 39). Therefore they have so far enjoyed the 
generous support from Norway, as well as local entrepreneurs and businessmen. The position from 
the ethnic groups towards these has also shown to be rather negative, as they see them as furthering 
an economic agenda before a political.  
So despite of fundamental disagreements, the government and the ethnic groups both present a wish 
to keep the political arena, in which the more substantial decisions about the future of the Burmese 
state should be discussed, free from external influence. It is, as is also stated by the Norwegian 
ambassador above, a domestic and indigenous affair, and it touches upon the question of state 
sovereignty. It becomes an extremely relevant consideration when looking at cases like East Timor 
and Afghanistan, where external actors end up having significant power in this area and end up 
building a state that the society does not feel familiar with (we will return to this in the discussion).  
Though, as guarantors for a trustworthy and legitimate process, involvement of external actors has 
been presented as crucial for the ethnic groups in order to make sure that the government sticks to 
their promises. Putting this in perspective to what the literature tells us about earlier experiences and 
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‘best practices’34, cf. first part of our theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, it thus becomes 
relevant to look more into what kind of conflict is actually going on in Myanmar. This is 
furthermore a central step in order to answer our research question, and we will therefore now turn 
to next section of our analysis, dealing with the diverging perceptions of the state.  
  
2.3 Perception of the state as a sticking point 
After an extensive reading of news articles outlining statements of both parties in the Myanmar 
conflict and a review of literature on the historical and current context, we have identified one 
central issue that seems to be the core of the discussion and the factor that prevents further 
movement in the peace process in Myanmar: the perception of statehood; how the state should be 
structured, and how power should be distributed between authorities and ethnic nationalities, stands 
out as a central key point in the conflict – or, how we have decided to call it, the sticking point of the 
conflict. Sticking point is something that is encountered when “conditions are attached to 
negotiations which prevent forward movement” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005: 172), 
and it can thus be argued that it is the point that makes the conflicting parties’ agreement flaw. We 
are aware that there are other issues at stake, though we would argue that the central debates and 
disagreements between the conflicting actors revolve around this fundamental question of how to 
understand and define the Burmese state.  
Before moving further into the analysis of different perceptions of the state, it is important to stress 
the complex diversity that lies within ethnicity in Myanmar. This is dominantly explained by the 
fact that ethnicity touches upon deep perceptions about identity and belonging, and in this also how 
to govern and construct a state, a perception confirmed by Jim Della-Giacoma and Richard Horsey 
stating that “the political dialogue, and even the means by which it will be done, is a highly 
contentious subject as it touches upon fundamental issues of state structure and the so far dominant 
role of Burmans in the country” (Della-Giacoma and Horsey 2013: 3). As mentioned in the outline 
of the historical context (chapter one), Myanmar consists of 135 ethnic groups where the majority is 
Bamar (68 %). They have since the British rule been the majority in the ruling elite and according to 
Della-Giacoma and Horsey:   
 
“The fundamental problem driving these enduring and complex conflicts is that Myanmar is a 
country dominated by one ethnic group, the Burman, also known as the Bamar, and by one religion, 
Buddhism. It is governed for the benefit of its majority and at the expense of its minorities. As one 
                                                
34 Wallensteen (2012), Ramsbotham et al (2005), Svensson (2009), Bell (2006) and Armengol (2012) 
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ethnic leader famously stated, “Burma doesn’t have an ethnic minority problem, it has an ethnic 
majority problem” (ibid.).  
 
In addition, Ghai states that one of the major obstacles in defining the state is the multiethnic 
citizenship with its multifaceted linguistic and cultural heritage (Ghai 2008: 2). And this is not 
acknowledged and protected in the way the regime is governed currently, according to the ethnic 
groups.  
 
The concretization of the sticking point 
In the ongoing peace talks there have been many references to the incumbent constitution from 
2008. It quickly becomes obvious that there is a fundamental disagreement about its legitimacy and 
content when reviewing the public statements from the ethnic groups and the government 
respectively35. This is the basis for our focus on the 2008 constitution, which we see as the most 
complete concretization of the sticking point about ‘the perception of the state’. After signing 14 out 
of 16 of the bilateral ceasefires, political dialogue is the next step in the peace process. This seems to 
be a highly contentious phase, in which the constitution will probably become a core discussion 
point. It is also already delayed, according to the peace plans published by Myanmar Peace Monitor 
(Myanmar Peace Monitor). Before moving further in our effort to understand the sticking point in 
the peace process concerning perceptions of the state, we will start by outlining the basic principles 
of the 2008 constitution. The entire constitution is more than 200 pages, but the principles often 
referred to are ‘the basic principles’, which are the following:  
(a) Non-disintegration of the Union;  
(b) Non-disintegration of National solidarity;  
(c) Perpetuation of sovereignty;  
(d) Flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system;  
(e) Enhancing the eternal principles of Justice, Liberty and Equality in the Union  
(f) Enabling the Defence Services to be able to participate in the National political  
leadership role of the State.  
(The 2008 constitution of Myanmar) 
 
                                                
35 In the joint Statement of the Ethnic Nationalities Conference from 2013 it is, as an example, expressed, ”The current 2008 Constitution 
practiced by U Thein Sein government is not accepted, as it is devoid of democratic essence and not in accordance with the principles of 
federalism. A new Constitution based on genuine federal principles will be drafted and promoted for practice”, 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/2013-08-02-Statement-of-the-Ethnic-Nationalities-Conference-en.pdf 
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These principles and the rest of the constitution are according to Thein Sein and the government the 
foundation to the future building of the state. In his speech on March 30th 2011 Thein Sein 
underlines how the 2008 constitution is a building block on which the future of the Burmese state 
lies, and calls for compliance to the national norms by stating that “there are so many individuals 
and unlawful organizations inside and outside the nation that do not accept the State's seven-step 
Road Map and the Constitution. They are all citizens of our country. Therefore, they have to accept 
our government as their government agro-constituted with national races of their own” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Myanmar).  
Even though he states that everyone should work with him and his government and thereby the 
constitution, he also acknowledges that not everyone accepts the constitution, which is a new 
approach in comparison with previous governments (EBO 2011: 2). Thein Sein continues his 
educative tone in his speech by saying that “According to Chapter (XII), the people have been vested 
the rights to amend the constitution in line with procedures. Therefore, every citizen has to avoid 
any activities and speeches that harm the image of the country and interests of the people” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Myanmar). This is a very interesting statement, in regards to the formation of the 
parliament charted by the 2008 constitution, which we will now look at.  
 
The power of the elite is institutionalized 
In the 2008 constitution there is a chapter stating that the Commander-in-Chief constitutes 25% of 
the members of both chambers of the national parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) (2008 Constitutiom: 
Ch. IV.109, 141) and one-third of the membership of the state and regional parliaments (Ibid.: 
Ch.IV.161.d). This dominance of the military is both a democratic problem and a problem in regards 
to the integration of the voice of the citizens in the political dialogue. Though Thein Sein said in this 
inauguration speech that he would show “genuine goodwill towards those who have not accepted 
the constitution […] order that they can discard their suspicions and play a part in the nation-
building tasks” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Myanmar). He furthers a discourse about being open to 
his conflicting parties, but as long as the Tatmadaw maintains their 25% of the seats in the national 
parliament they have the power to block any constitutional change (Nilsen et al.: 2012: 3), which is 
what the ethnic groups (being ‘those who have not accepted the constitution’) would like to do.  
Therefore it is argued by the Euro Burma Office that Thein Sein’s statements are either attempts of 
“window dressing” or it is an actual acknowledgement of the possibility of an amendment of the 
constitution in case of national unity (EBO 2011: 3), even though he believes that it will ‘hurt the 
people’ (dvb.no 2014b). In 2012 Marte Nilsen and Stein Tønnesson argue in their article Can 
 39 
Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution Be Made To Satisfy Ethnic Aspirations? that an amendment of the 
constitution was not on the government’s agenda when they opened up for peace talks in 2011 
(Nilsen et al.: 2012: 2). The ongoing pressure from the ethnic groups has in the meantime forced the 
government to include an eventual revise of the 2008 constitution in the peace plans. Nilsen and 
Tønnesson argue that the reasons for the government’s refusal of rewriting or changing the 
constitution are among others the question of distribution of power within the state, and when the 
government founded the constitution in 2008 their ambition was to institutionalize the military 
(Ibid.).  
A common understanding among the ethnic groups is as a community worker from Shan State 
argues: 
''Politics and community concerns keep getting taken off the agenda, development is the most 
important item, […] This has caused a lot of tension between the armed groups and civil society 
organisations. We are all aware, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, that the 2008 constitution is 
unjust, it gives too much power to the military, but there is little talk from anyone in politics about 
rewriting it” (Bangkokpost.com 2012). Though in fact just in these days (as writing this) it is highly 
debated in the news media. The 17th of May 2014 Thein Sein commented on the instability caused 
by the ongoing debates about an eventual change of the constitution, reports an article published in 
Democratic Voice of Burma (dvb.no 2014b). He asks the people to be patient and protect national 
stability, without commenting further on whether an actual change of the constitution is going to 
happen or not: “nobody wants to endure the instability that these issues [amending the constitution 
and holding free and fair elections] are causing. It will hurt the people … I would like to urge all 
people and monks who love this country to protect it from instability”(dvb.no 2014b). Thus it does 
not seem as though it is currently his biggest wish to make a reform of the constitution, even though 
he opens up for the possibility. Ethnic groups, on the contrary, defy the constitution, and refer 
instead to the need to go back to the ‘Panglong Spirit’, which we will now look at.  
  
The Panglong Spirit 
As mentioned in chapter 2.1 today’s notion of the Panglong Spirit was founded in 1947 with the 
Panglong Agreement by general Aung San, representative of the Burmese government, and 
representatives from Chin, Kachin, og Shan. The outcome of Panglong was an agreement on how to 
include the Frontier Areas’ right to self-determination under the Union of Burma (The Panglong 
Agreement 1947). It is though important to keep in mind that different perceptions of the agreement 
exist, and according to Matthew Walton ”Burma (and indeed, any multi-ethnic nation) faces the 
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dilemma of attempting to build national unity on a myth that is perceived in drastically different 
(often exclusionary) ways by the different groups it seeks to incorporate” (Walton 2008: 910). 
Walton argues that a myth is a perception of ‘who we are’ and ‘where we are going’, and the 
Panglong Agreement is in this regards then a varying perception depending on who talks about it. 
The difference in perception and terminology, also when it comes to other topics, is also pointed out 
by Johnson and Lidauer (2014) when they state that “Outstanding issues mostly revolve around 
questions of terminology, for example of the term Panglong spirit, genuine federal union, as well as 
the hammering out of details such as how to organise the joint monitoring committee” (Johnson and 
Lidauer 2014: 41).  
 
When referring to the Panglong Spirit, what is often perceived is the notion of a united ethnic front, 
but what is actually the case, Walton explains, is that only three ethnic groups were represented and 
thereby signed the agreement with Aung San. The reason for this was that the negotiations were 
only between the Burmese government and the ethnic groups living in the Frontier Areas. Hence 
Karen, Mon and Arakan were situated in Ministerial Burma they were not represented. Therefore it 
is important to keep in mind that the Panglong Agreement was only between the Burmese 
Government and certain ethnic groups, while the ethnic groups situated in the Ministerial Burma to 
a larger extend collaborated with the British colonizers (Walton 2008). Furthermore Walton argues 
that fractions among the ethnic groups have dominated the history of the Panglong Spirit.  
The main argument from Walton is qua his statement outlined above that certain dilemmas rise 
when the rebuilding of a state is based on a myth, where the actors involved have different 
perceptions and attribute different values to the shared concepts, which in this case is the ‘Spirit of 
Panglong’. Therefore he argues as follows: ”calls for a return to the “spirit of Panglong” will 
remain ineffective unless the event and its consequences are understood. The reassessment of 
modern Burma’s founding myth will be a necessary step in the struggle for national unity” (Walton 
2008: 910). Though he states that the Panglong Conference might be the event that came closest to 
embodying ethnic unity in Burma, and still today it compels the image of the possibility of ethnic 
unity (ibid.). 
 
Self-determination and the wish for a federal state 
Following the above outlined of statements from both the ethnic groups and the government on 
which document the future structure of the state in Myanmar should be built, we will now turn to 
another aspect within the contested perception of the state – federalism and the right to self-
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determination. Within the perception of how to define the state, a very precarious perspective is the 
ethnic groups’ wish for self-determination in a federal state, a claim that is based on the before 
mentioned ‘Panglong Spirit’. As analysts of the 2008 constitution confirm (Nilsen et al.: 2012; Ghai 
2008), the prescriptions in this are more or less cable of rejecting all solutions compromising the 
unity of the state and the other basic principles of the state: non-disintegration of National solidarity 
and perpetuation of National sovereignty.  
One part of the constitution has though in regards to the wishes for a federal state a promising 
aspect. The establishment of elected regional and state assemblies is a step on the way towards what 
the ethnic groups are pledging for. According to Nilsen and Tønnesson “By creating seven regional 
and seven state hluttaws, Myanmar has established constitutionally embedded bodies that might 
provide minorities with an opportunity to practise a degree of internal self-governance”(Nilsen et 
al.: 2012: 3). Though, the power of the regional state assemblies is very limited, because the 
constitution does not provide them with real power. In stead the regional chief minister is appointed 
by and responsible to the president in all matters and not to the regional hluttaws (Ibid). This means 
that the power of the regional hluttaws to a large extend is pro forma and can be interpreted as the 
government’s attempt to meet the demands from the ethnic groups, without loosing their grip of 
power. It is possible to argue that this is the case with all distribution of power in Myanmar. The 
constitution provide different state actors with some kind of pro forma power, but in the end there 
are no separation of powers, because the state powers have a direct link to the president and is 
therefore more a less subject to his influence or direction. Furthermore a respectively large part of 
the power is placed at the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and in between the powers of 
the president and the Commander-in-Chief there is not much scope for democracy or accountability 
of executive authorities, it is evaluated by Ghai (2008: 11).  
 
Federalism and the Panglong: difference ideas 
As mentioned above, what the ethnic groups state is that they want a rewriting of the constitution 
based on the ‘Panglong Spirit’. As mentioned in the chapter about the history of Burma, the idea of 
a federal state can be traced back to the time before the independence in 1948 and even though 
president Thein Sein in a speech held on Myanmar’s Union Day in April 2011 stated that “All 
national races are to establish the national unity based on ‘the Panglong Spirit’ and then march 
toward a peaceful, modern, and democratic nation through a federal system” (Irrawaddy.org 2014c) 
the 2008 constitution seems in many ways to oppose to the thoughts of ’the Panglong Spirit’.  
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As a response to Thein Sein’s acknowledgement of the need for a federal state Karen National 
Union secretary Phado Kway Htoo Win states that: ”(…) under President Thein Sein the 
government has promised to move toward a federal system. This is a good sign” (rfa.org 2014), and 
continues by saying, ”We have been afraid of using the word ‘federal’ because it makes people think 
we want to split off from the nation when they hear this word” (rfa.org 2014). Instead of a split off 
from the nation Saw Than Myint from the Federal Union Party states that a federal system would 
address and solve their grievances towards the 2008 constitution, which he explains as: “We don’t 
have the opportunity to manage and govern or make our own laws … in our own states and regions. 
We can’t even manage our own natural resources” (rfa.org 2014). It is interesting, though, how The 
Karen secretary expresses it as a ‘fear’ to be misunderstood as wanting to resign from the nation. It 
marks at least the wish from the Karen National Union that they have an open approach to the 
government, and that they are willing to negotiate, not quarrel. 
 
Furthermore on a meeting in Chaing Mai, Thailand between The Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination 
Team36 (NCCT)’s Nai Hongsa, vice-chairman and Commander-in-Chief discussed a six-point wish 
list made by the government with Burma’s Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing. According to 
Nai Hongsa the NCCT could only agree on four out of the six wished. The two points the NCCT 
could not accept were: “Point five was that we, the ethnic armed groups, would pledge to fully 
adhere to the existing laws of the country. This effectively means we would be surrendering, 
politically, to Naypyidaw (…) The sixth point, that we recognise the 2008 Constitution – we cannot 
agree with that either” (dvb.no 2014c). According to him the 2008 constitution is misleading to the 
rights of the ethnic minority. Furthermore Nai Hongsa states that “The Burmese military seems to be 
keen on achieving a nationwide ceasefire but they do not want to get involved in political dialogue” 
(ibid.). 
 
In his article “The Union of Burma: rejecting panglong agreement could reignite extreme type of 
self-determination” Sai Wansai (2011) argues that if the government keeps wandering around the 
bush instead of reaching out to the real core of the problem – the ethnic groups’ wish for equality 
and self-determination - extreme cases of self-determination are going to occur. If the government 
continues to maintain their position with the 2008 constitution as their foundation for negotiations 
and reject the 1947 Panglong Agreement, they will never obtain a nationwide peace agreement and 
                                                
36 The Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) was founded on the Laiza Conference held on 30th of Oct. – 2nd of Nov. 2013 
and is a cooperation between seventeen ethnic armed groups, acting as the representative of the ethnic armed groups when negotiating 
with the government. 
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the rebuilding of the state will stall indefinitely (Wansai 2011). Moreover he argues that: “The non-
Burman ethnic groups are ready to be part of the federal union, if their rights of self-determination, 
equality and democracy aspirations could be fulfilled. And they simply don’t see any hope in the 
military-drawn, 2008 Constitution. That has let the ethnic groups to fall back on Panglong 
Agreement, which has been the sole legal bond between them and the Burman” (Ibid.). 
 
Summing up 
Above we have outlined why perceptions of the state and in particular the 2008 constitution is a 
sticking point in the conflict. It has showed us that finding a solution to the conflict is going to be 
difficult as long as the parties cannot agree on what the legal foundation for the political dialogue 
should be. The ethnic groups argue that the framework for political dialogue should be the ‘Spirit of 
Panglong’, because the agreement made in 1947 acknowledges their right to self-determination in a 
federal state. It is though important to keep in mind that the ‘Spirit of Panglong’ to some extent 
relies on a myth differently perceived among the parties involved, meaning that the government as 
well refers to the Panglong Spirit. The ethnic groups reject the 2008 constitution as the framework 
for negotiation with the government because the constitution neglects their wish for self-
determination and their demand for equality. Thein Sein did already in his inaugural speech in 2011 
mention the possibility for an amendment of the constitution, and on several occasions later on, he 
has repeated this statement, but so far nothing has changed, and one might question the sincerity of 
his statement. Time will show whether it is just ‘window dressing’ or a rewrite of the constitution is 
actually going to happen. From one position it would be possible to argue that the government has 
maintained its previous power wrapped in promises of change and that their intentions point to 
maintaining status quo, just with a new face. Moreover Sai Wansai argues that if the government 
continues with this strategy the ethnic groups might take it to the ‘extreme’, which makes him state 
that maintaining status quo is not sustainable. So far it can be concluded that despite good intentions 
from both sides of the conflict, there are indeed diverging ideas about the statehood of a new 
Myanmar, though the conflicting parties often use almost the same terminology.  
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3. Discussion: A state in the making or 
preservation of status quo? 
 
In this last part of the study we will pull strings from the three analytical sections above. We will 
discuss the connection between respectively the rather limited involvement of third parties that we 
have identified in the second section of the analysis and the dispute about a re-definition of the state, 
which we have identified as a central sticking point in the third section. To do this we will include 
perspectives from scholars and peace workers that have studied or become familiar with the 
Burmese situation and conflict, as well as our own presentation of the historical context in the first 
section. The overall aim with our efforts in this study is to understand the peace process in Myanmar 
in an international perspective by looking at the involvement of third parties and the contested 
perception of the state as a sticking point. In previous section we studied perspectives to an actual 
reform of the state of Myanmar. In this we scrutinized the 2008 constitution and the debate around 
an eventual amendment of it, and we looked at other statements about the perception of the state, 
including the inaugural speech of Thein Sein. We have argued that one of the central sticking points 
in the conflict is the structure of the Burmese state, since the questions of federalism and self-
determination were key issues in the initiation of the conflict, and are still heavily contested today: 
these seem to us to be the core of the problem that, at least for the moment, prevent further progress. 
Furthermore we have argued that at this point in the Myanmar peace process involvement of 
external third parties has been rather limited. Though we have also presented MPSI as an actor that 
possess soft-power with influence over the framing of the communication as trust-builders and 
coordinator of all other international actors working with peace. Furthermore we believe that MPSI 
cannot be separated from the diplomatic and economic links between Norway and Myanmar, which 
clearly has political implications. MPSI also builds on the international ideas underlying the New 
Deal Framework, and in that way it could be argued that they represent the contemporary ‘peace 
building consensus’ of the international society. With these preliminary conclusions in mind, we 
will now discuss how these aspects can give a deeper understanding of the current peace process in 
Myanmar. Furthermore we will come with some few possible scenarios for the future of peace in 
Myanmar.  
 
Reform of the state or preservation of status quo? 
The substantive framework agreements that are to come in Myanmar should, if we take in the 
perspective from Christine Bell, establish (or confirm) mechanisms not only for demilitarization and 
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demobilization intended to end military violence, but also link the mechanisms to “new 
constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions” 
(Bell 2006: 377). We have identified that this is a conflict over statehood, ethnic sovereignty, and 
the right to identity. After a field study in Myanmar in 2013, Zarni writes that the position of the 
elite (government and military) expressed in the public is clearly that they are in favour of moving 
towards democracy and removing the military from politics over time - if just the security of the 
nation can be guaranteed. Zarni then argues that it is a challenge due to the fact that there are many 
powerful interests tied to the military about maintaining the current situation and making sure that 
they will not have to share any of the diamonds, the oil or the timber with the ethnic minorities 
(Zarni 2013: 5). As it stands out after our analysis on the different perceptions of the state, the ethnic 
groups and government talk more or less about the same things with the same concepts, but they 
mean different things. This might be one of the essential obstacles for reaching a unifying peace 
agreement (which is also a point made by Walton 2008). Whether the fundamental disputes about 
the state structure will be completely resolved (as Bell argues was the case of South Africa, through 
a reform of the state) is still an open question. But we argue that discussing a reform of the 
constitution means opening up the discussion for a redefinition of the state. As far as we have been 
able to analyse, a reform of the structure of the state is what the ethnic groups is striving for. The 
opposite would be the preservation of status quo. It would be wrong to state that this is what the 
government wants, though it has been criticized for being the military regime’s “pretty face” (EBO 
2011), that it is only empty words and the government’s Peace Center “is being paid for doing 
nothing” (Lintner in Irrawaddy.org 2014b). Marte Nilsen did, as part of a research field trip with 
Peace Research Institute in Oslo and Uppsala University, a broad range of interviews with peace 
stakeholders in Myanmar in 2012 and 2013. The limited confidence in the government’s real 
incentives for peace was also dominant after her fieldwork, about which she writes, “many 
expressed distrust in the peace process and warned that the ruling elite first and foremost is 
interested in securing the status quo” (Nilsen 2013: 124). But just as we are writing these words, the 
Burmese media report how the government these days is debating an eventual amendment of the 
constitution – with a strong underlining of preserving national sovereignty (Global Times 2014, 
dvb.no 2014b). 
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The peace process: a domestic affair 
In an article from the 17th of May 2014 Thein Sein states, “Amending the constitution and holding 
free and fair elections are our internal affairs. We can perform them under national legislation 
without damaging our sovereignty” (dvb.no 2014b). Re-defining the state should thus be held a 
domestic discussion in Myanmar, according to Thein Sein. This is a clear message to eventually 
interested external actors not to intervene in the next stages of the peace process when the political 
dialogue will be initiated. Ethnic groups though see international third parties as possible guarantors, 
as we have pointed to in the second section of the analysis. As witnesses to the peace process they 
can guarantee legitimacy to the process (Armengol 2012), which will (as it is hoped) make sure that 
the ethnic groups are heard, their grievances acknowledged and their claims and wishes incorporated 
in the political restructuring in order to establish a permanent peace. This tendency is also 
mentioned by Bell, she writes about how especially non-state actors seem to use third party presence 
to resist own local ‘outbidders’ and stand stronger against ‘the other side’ (the powerful conflicting 
party, the state/army) (Bell 2006: 402)37. Though, as we have also showed in our chapter on third 
party involvement, the ethnic groups do not want foreign experts to tell them what to do. The 
‘veteran Swedish journalist’, Bertil Lintner also expresses the critique that peace ‘experts’ dominate 
too much on Burmese affairs. In an article from Irrawaddy (2014b) it is put forward how he sees the 
peace process has become an industry where international peace experts and NGOs are lavishing 
money on peace advocacy and development projects. Due to lack of knowledge and understanding 
to the local context they do more harm than good, it is stated (Irrawaddy 2014b).  
So, the conflicting parties do agree that no external actor should in a substantial way define the next 
path for Myanmar. They also agree that peaceful relations (meaning no violent confrontations) 
should be secured in order to make progress in the country. But that seems to be where their 
agreements end. Though, when it supports their side (being the marginalized in the conflict) the 
ethnic groups ask for external involvement. This is not unusual, as Svensson (2009) and Bell (2006) 
have argued as well. 
 
On the other hand, the ethnic groups neither have full confidence to the current mediators in the 
conflict, the local businessmen from Dawei Princess, Egress and Peace Talk Creation Group, whom 
we have described in section 2.2. The ethnic groups simply doubt their motives because they see 
them as representatives of private companies with a business agenda, which will set the much-
                                                
37 Svensson (2009) furthermore gives perspectives on what it then implies to have respectively neutral or biased actors, though he 
mostly talks about it in cases of mediation. His point is that neutral mediators would also enforce less commitment from the parties, 
whereas biased third parties would most likely promote a higher degree of commitment from the parties to the agreement. 
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needed political dialogue as second rank. The ethnic groups have many times stated that they want 
political dialogue before development and economic growth (Bangkokpost.com 2012, dvb.no 
2014c). That is also why they have been reluctant to make a nationwide ceasefire before they are 
assured that it would be followed by political dialogue (The Nation 2014); they want to be sure that 
fundamental political issues are taken up, and not end up getting forgotten behind humanitarian aid 
and talk about stability (Zarni 2013) and being “bought to peace” (MPSI 2014: 19, 42). But would it 
be possible to have peace without reaching binding agreements about a new Myanmar?  
 
Peace without substantial political re-arrangements? 
The discussion around what peace involves is huge, and we are not able to take in all its aspects 
here. Though, an essential issue is the question of whether peace necessarily includes solving the 
central incompatibilities of the conflict through thoroughgoing agreements and consent or if a 
situation without actual fighting could also be considered ‘peace’ (what Johan Galtung would 
consider negative peace, cf. Wallensteen 2012: 3-10; Ramsbotham 2005: 41).  
As we have argued above the Myanmar government wants peace and stability; they want 
development of the country after years of economic stagnation and exclusion from international 
trade (Irinnews.org 2012). Echoing the Army’s primary priority, the government stresses national 
security, the preservation of national interests and state sovereignty as the main task ahead (Global 
Times 2014, 2008 Constitution). Though, at the same time, they need money and an improved 
relation to the international community. The invitation of external actors to participate in the 
transition process therefore could be understood as an economic pragmatic decision. This is also 
influential in the way the Army has still not resisted significantly to the democratizations a recent 
report published by the International Crisis Group argues (ICG 2014b). The army, though, still 
possesses a strong power, and whether their fear of loosing the grip will be a spoiler in the peace 
process is yet not possible to say. As said, they have so far not fought directly against the transition 
process initiated by the president, in fact they have allowed, and to some extent also embraced the 
reforms (ibid.). One of the reasons for this, according to ICG, is what they describe as ‘the China 
factor’ (ICG 2014b: 7). With the isolation of Myanmar from the international society, China, as the 
Asian (and increasingly the world’s) great power (see more in Henderson et al. 2013), has been a 
key source for credit, investment and political protection for Myanmar. This has long concerned 
Myanmar’s political elite, and thus, in order for Myanmar to counterbalance the Chinese power, 
they need to take advantage of the opening to the West, and make a strategic relationship with the 
US (who, according to ICG was the only state that could fill out that role) (ibid.).  
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Though, as the report from ICG also argues, it is most likely that Tatmadaw will still wants to 
preserve a great deal of influence (ibid.). This is in line with Zarni’s argument about the little 
possibility for an actor like Norway to approximate the Tatmadaw in order to integrate ‘the elephant 
in the room’ (Irinnews.org 2012’s word for the Army) in their peace building activities. Zarni states, 
“It is highly doubtful that the Ministry of Defence will allow an external Western peace initiative 
any serious and direct link with the military on subjects that it considers strictly sovereign matters” 
(Zarni 2013: 6).  
According to one of the country’s most important ethnic stakeholders (in the eyes of Zarni at least), 
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) chairman Zawng Hra Zarni, Aung Min, Naypyidaw’s 
chief negotiatior “has always avoided talking about political issues. His duty is only to present and 
follow his government's policies.” (ibid.: 5). So if the military will not take part in the political 
dialogues and make the necessary adjustments in order to democratize the country, it might be 
difficult to see sustainable peace ahead. We have questioned earlier whether the military-regime, led 
by the reform-minded Thein Sein, is only doing window dressing. Another question is, whether the 
current government’s chief negotiator Aung Min can be considered the right man to engage in 
political talks and negotiate peace between the conflicting parties. At least his mandate is 
problematized both by Zarni (ibid.) and the Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner (Irrawaddy.org 2014b). 
The mandate and status of peace negotiators will, according to Bell (2006) and her fellow peace 
researchers, always be questioned in highly political situations as peace processes are. This 
furthermore addresses to question of confidence, as well a key element and a challenge throughout 
the whole process.  
 
In Myanmar, many scholars and peace workers argue, trust building is to a large extent what is still 
missing (Johnson and Lidauer 2014, Nilsen 2013, East 101 etc.). This has been one of the key tasks 
of MPSI, as we have mentioned earlier. They are working in a complex situation with many 
diverging interests to take care of. Due to the complexity and very contemporary and ever-changing 
character of the situation it has not been able for us to analyse the norms and objectives of MPSI in 
depth, and maybe it cannot be done until a later point, when it is possible to see some outcomes of 
their involvement in the peace process. We have stated earlier that Norway might have liked to have 
a more significant role in the peace negotiations; this is first and foremost based on analyses of 
earlier Norwegian peace operations and the proclamation that Norway has an interest in staying one 
of the world’s great peacemakers (Stokke 2010, Höglund and Svensson 2009, Zarni 2013 etc.), as 
well as a point from a personal conversation with an anonymous source close to the peace process in 
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Myanmar. But getting a role that is too significant can also be risky, as will be shown in the 
following.  
 
The horror scenario 
In order to understand the reluctance from stakeholders in Myanmar to hand over influence and 
power to external actors it is relevant to consider some earlier experiences with contemporary peace 
building. East Timor might be the ‘worst case scenario’ for Myanmar’s government. In three years it 
was victim of what Bell calls an internationalization of transition in the exercise of international 
territorial administration (Wilde 2001 in Bell 2006: 407; Chopra 2002). The UN Administration in 
East Timor was established in 1999 to administer the territory and exercise legislative and executive 
authority during the transition period. It furthermore supported capacity building for self-
government. In 2002 the country became independent (UN.org). Jarat Chopra, who resigned as head 
of the UN administration in East Timor, but still works within the UN in various peace operations 
writes in his article Building State Failure in East Timor that missions as the one in East Timor risk 
contributing to “more negative than if they had not intervened at all. They may undermine 
indigenous forms of political legitimacy without establishing a reliable alternative and functioning 
administrative structure” (Chopra 2002: 995). He describes the failing UN effort to build up a 
sustainable state, and calls for a need for an elaboration (and practice) of the concept of 
`participatory intervention' (Chopra 2002). The newly presented New Deal Framework for working 
in Fragile States (New Deal 2013) might have been an effort in this regard. At least it highlights the 
importance of participatory approaches in international interventions (ibid.).  
 
Afghanistan is another example of an international intervention aiming at building up a (new) state. 
It is not wrong to say that it has received a great amount of critique. One critique is expressed by 
Toby Dodge from London School of Economics (Dodge 2013). In an article on international liberal 
state building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2013 he states that in Afghanistan ”post-
intervention attempts at reforming state-society relations and rebuilding sustainable state 
infrastructure have made little progress” (Dodge 2013: 1207). Instead the state has become 
detached from society, and today, he continues “12 years after regime change, [Afghanistan] 
remains a rentier state where 97 per cent of its gross domestic product comes from international 
donor-related activity” (ibid.: 1208). He argues that liberal peace building, as it has been seen in 
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Iraq and Afghanistan, has become the third generation of international conflict resolution, which 
was deliberately called for by Kofi Annan in the end of the 90’s38 (ibid.: 1194). 
 
Liberal peace – no thanks! 
We presented how we understand the ‘liberal peace paradigm’ – and maybe especially the critique 
of it - in the outline of our theoretical framework in chapter 1.5. By now it should stand clear that 
the Myanmar government (as well as the ethnic groups to some extent) does not want external actors 
to have substantial influence in domestic affairs, of which an eventual amendment of the 
constitution (also meaning an eventual redefinition of the state) is part of. They have thus, so far, 
said no to an internationalization of the conflict, as was the case e.g. in East Timor. With this they 
have also protected themselves from too much diffusion of norms and institutional models from the 
international (western dominated) system (Paris 2002). The critique formulated by Paris is that in 
international peace building operations and research on peace and conflict resolution too little 
attention has been given to the promotion of certain (western) standards that define how states 
should organize themselves internally. He links it to the term mission civilisatrice, meaning that 
international peace building has often included this ‘civilizing’, ‘educative’ and ‘modernizing’ 
approach to the local conflict and its implied actors. The norm promotion has to a large extent also 
come from international experts, Paris argues. This is also a point made by Bell, as we have 
mentioned earlier. The universalization and essentialization of peace that have happened with the 
‘liberal peace paradigm’, as Hagmann and Goetshel describe, have meant that peace has become 
depoliticized (Hagmann and Goetschel 2011). In regards to this, it is interesting how the ethnic 
groups call for a return of politics in Myanmar. Their claim is that the government and international 
peacemakers try to buy them off with development and economic prosperity, neglecting the political 
dialogue.  
Even though it is not expressed as such by either the ethnic groups or the government, it can be 
argued that both parties reject ready-made peace and state building packages coming from the west. 
They want to do it their way, which is then what needs to be agreed upon: what is ‘the Myanmar 
way’? 
The reluctance to let Aung San Suu Kyi mediate in the peace process, as well as making it possible 
for her to be candidate in elections (impossible cf. 2008 constitution; Nilsen 2013: 132) might be a 
question of not only that she is a threat to the current government’s power but also that she, having 
                                                
38 As Dodge explains it, “Annan deliberately set out to change international norms, shifting the emphasis from state sovereignty to liberal 
interventionism justified in the name of individual human rights” (Dodge 2013: 1194) 
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studied at Oxford and to a large extent deploy the language of the liberal peace paradigm (she 
furthers very much the discourse of “rule-of-law” and liberal democracy), represents Western ideas 
of state building that the government (and ethnic groups) do not want to subscribe to. Though 
unfortunately we are not able to dig further into the question in this report.  
 
At the moment there are no real prospects for Myanmar to become a “victim” of the kind of 
internationalization that we have seen in East Timor and Afghanistan. But whether it can be argued 
that Myanmar is transforming fundamentally through predominantly domestic driven reconstruction, 
i.e. without foreign influence, might on the other hand not be true. NGOs and initiatives such as 
MPSI work with central issues of statehood; capacity building of ethnic minorities in regards to self-
determination, education systems, health systems, national reconciliation, support to internally 
displaced people and trust-building are some examples. It should be noted that some areas in 
Myanmar are actually non-state administered territories. Whether the term ‘Self-Administered 
territories’39 covers all territories that are not then under administration of Union, Region or State 
authorities can be questioned. But in some territories that are outside state control, ethnic groups 
have established autonomous schools, health clinics and other public services, as Ashley South and 
Marie Lall have studies (South and Lall 2012). In the constitution the ‘Self-administered territories’ 
are described as having the control over town and village planning such as construction, repair and 
maintenance of roads and bridges; public health; development plans; water and electricity supply; 
fire prevention; pasture; forest protection and environmental conservation. Though, as Ghai states, 
this ‘self-administration’ is always in accordance with the law enacted by the Union (Ghai 2008:34).  
When fighting for a federal state and the right to self-determination, the ethnic groups that have 
succeeded in building up their own microstate (i.e. with autonomous schools teaching the 
indigenous language etc.) are fighting for the right to keep the institutions that they have already 
created functioning. It should be noted that there are obviously diverging aims and priorities among 
the ethnic groups, also about the level of connection to the Union on the provision of public services 
(South and Lall 2012, Nilsen 2013). Whether the ethnic groups will manage to include a real ethnic 
sovereignty in the coming political framework for a new state structure (assuming that it will 
happen) is still not to be said.  
 
                                                
39 cf. 2008 constitution. They are, according to Ghai (2008), still under the overall authority of the president 
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Summing up and future perspectives 
In this chapter we have integrated the earlier analytical chapters in one crosscutting discussion. We 
have asked how the involvement of, and attitudes towards, international 3rd parties in the Myanmar 
peace process eventually could tell us something about the perception of a re-definition of the 
Burmese state. We have pointed to relevant perspectives around the influence of the third parties 
involved in a process like the one of Myanmar, which deals with fundamental discussions about an 
eventual reform of the state. Through the presented critique of the ‘liberal peace paradigm’ and 
references to earlier experiences with international peace and state building we argue that it 
somehow ‘makes sense’ that no external actor has been invited to mediate in the peace negotiations 
in Myanmar. Even though it is a strong wish from the ethnic groups to have international observers, 
they do not posses enough agency to decide over this topic, due to the fact that the government and 
the army posses strong power and have essential negative perceptions of too much involvement of 
the international society in domestic affairs.  
 
We have furthermore presented a characterization of the current situation in Myanmar. With these in 
mind some preliminary perspectives on what might be the outcome of the process could be made. 
The reforms may bring democracy and economic progress to most parts of Myanmar, as Nilsen also 
concludes, and it will most likely improve living conditions for people in former conflict areas, and 
as she argues, this will happen “not least if programmes like the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 
succeed in facilitating peace dividends”. Though, at the same time she states, “the prospects for 
peace are uncertain” (Nilsen 2013: 133). The push for amendment of the constitution has focused 
particularly on overturning the article that dictated that any proposals to amend clauses of the 2008 
Constitution must be approved by 75 percent of representatives in both chambers of parliament, 
meaning that it would require the consent of the Tatmadaw, as it holds 25 percent of all seats (Della-
Giacoma and Horsey 2013: 5; dvb.no 2014c). Since it effectively holds veto power over the 
constitution, and the constitution is a central sticking point in the current conflict, it will be up to the 
Tatmadaw in the end to decide on the future of Myanmar. At least as long as a fundamental claim 
from the ethnic groups is a reform of the constitution. And to this, so far it does not seem that any 
external third party could be invited to assist in the solution of that problem.  
But obviously enough, there are many other issues to tackle and we might see new possibilities for 
other factors that could end up being turning points that in the end could open the door for 
permanent peace in Myanmar. Though from the research that we have made, so far this turning 
factor still seems unknown.  
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4. Conclusion 
In order to answer our research question, how can the peace process in Myanmar be understood in 
an international perspective when looking at the involvement of third parties and the contested 
perceptions of the state as a sticking point? we have made an analysis based on three levels. First we 
presented the contextual framework, giving a brief introduction to central events of the Myanmar 
history and insights to the current conflict. It showed how the conflict that is to be solved has deep 
roots in the colonial past and the struggle to re-define the state after having gained independence. It 
has been presented how re-defining the state structure is still a core issue in the conflict between the 
government and the ethnic minorities. As the transition towards democracy and peace was initiated, 
the country also opened up to the outside world. Third parties now take part in trying to solve the 
conflict, but they have not been allowed into real political discussions, and so far it is only domestic 
actors who do the task of mediating between the conflicting parties. As we wanted to look at the 
international influence in the Myanmar peace process we identified MPSI as a key actor who 
coordinates international support, engages in trust building between parties and facilitates 
discussions at community level with a blueprint from the Myanmar government. Though we have 
identified that the government leads a pragmatic economic approach towards third parties; they 
cannot have too much influence, but they are necessary in order to assure legitimacy and maybe 
most of all: finance the expensive travels and talks. The ethnic groups state that external actors are 
the key to guarantee that the government and the army stick to their promises, but since they have 
expressed allegations towards the international peace experts and human rights organizations, they 
do neither seem to want too much direct influence from actors that do not understand their cultural 
and political context.  
In order to understand the conflict we asked to what seemed to be the key challenge and point of 
discussion between the conflicting parties. We soon found that the 2008 constitution could be 
understood as a sticking point. It is directly referred to as a problem from the ethnic groups, and it 
touches upon deeper disagreements about statehood. Therefore our third section of the analysis dealt 
with the question about the diverging perceptions of the state. We presented how the ethnic groups 
refer to the Panglong Agreement as the legitimate legal foundation for the future political talks even 
though that agreement also entails various myths and cannot as such be considered an inclusive and 
unifying document. The government on the other hand presents the 2008 constitution as a legal 
working document, which should be followed by all citizens of Myanmar. They have opened up for 
the discussion of an eventual amendment, but so far nothing has happened, and one could doubt, 
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also taking in other aspects presented about the government’s commitment whether they have real 
intentions of establishing peace and listening to the ethnic minorities in the end. The third part of our 
analysis concludes that the conflicting parties to a large extent deploy the same terminology, but 
mean very different things, such as the concept of federalism.  
These three levels of the analysis were then combined in the discussion (chapter 3). Here literature 
from other peace processes was also included. Integrating these three aspects with perspectives from 
the critiques of the liberal peace paradigm of the international society, we believe that interesting 
perspectives appear that could help us understand essential things about the peace process. The 
reluctance from official Myanmar towards handing over too much influence to international third 
parties can in this way become understandable. By remembering earlier experiences of international 
support to state building it might not be so strange why the government of Myanmar draws the limit 
(in measuring the amount of influence that international actors can have) between humanitarian aid 
and actual state building. As a final remark in this study we have dared to give some few prospects 
for the future of Myanmar. In the light of six decades of violent conflict between the government 
and army on the one side, and ethnic minorities on the other, it must be said that the current situation 
is indeed pointing to improved conditions for local communities, more peaceful relations and a 
lighter future also in respect to economic progress. But the prospects for a permanent peace that 
includes new political settlements, which will be agreed upon by all stakeholders (including the 
many not completely agreeing ethnic groups) are still uncertain. As the military holds veto for an 
amendment of the constitution, and if this document continues as the sticking point of the conflict, it 
might be very difficult to imagine a real solution. And so far, they seem to want to manage their own 
affairs without external actors who seem to want to point the way forward for Myanmar.  
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